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Cyberspace has become an essential component of modern militaries. As this 
dependency grows, militaries who exploit this dependency may be able to hurt 
their adversaries within cyberspace to coerce them into a desirable action. This 
thesis will explore one particular use of cyber coercion, the use of cyber weapons 
to target supply chains, to study what methods may be best suited for cyber 
coercion. 
This thesis first looks at the possibilities for cyber coercion and the various 
factors that are important for an attack method to successfully coerce an 
adversary, including reusability, reversibility, and legality. It then proposes 
various cyber attacks that could be used in cyber coercion and reviews factors 
important in cyber coercion. Next, it takes these proposed methods and walks 
through three scenarios against fictional nation-states to analyze how these 
methods might perform in a cyber-coercion operation. Included are possible 
effects if these same attacks were used against the United States. Findings are 
then presented based on the scenarios. 
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The world remains a volatile place. Multiple countries are engaged in a 
long-standing territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Separatists have led 
uprisings in Crimea and other eastern Ukrainian regions. Populist uprisings 
continue throughout the Middle East since the commencement of the Arab 
Spring. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has gained control of 
territory in both Iraq and Syria and has killed several Western and allied-country 
hostages. Recent attacks on Sony Pictures attributed to North Korea have 
reminded us that these threats are not isolated to the physical world. Highlighting 
the threats faced in cyberspace, the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted five 
Chinese military hackers for their role in cyber operations against U.S. 
corporations. During his Senate confirmation hearing for Secretary of Defense, 
Leon Panetta warned, “the next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be 
a cyber attack” (Mulrine, 2011). The threat from cyber attacks continues to grow 
as dependency of the Internet has increased. Though Symantec (2014) reported 
that cyber attacks were down in 2013 compared to 2012, the focus and 
persistence of the attacks increased. The United States needs to be prepared for 
these attacks and to utilize cyber operations to its advantage. 
B. GOAL AND PURPOSE 
Coercion is using threats or force to persuade another to do something. 
This can be in the form of either deterrence, preventing another from taking an 
action, or compellence, encouraging another to revert from a position taken. 
Many argue that deterrence is not effective in cyberspace as nuclear weapons 
were during the Cold War. Deterrence in the Cold War era worked because both 
sides knew that an attack would be met with retaliation. Thus, both sides were 
deterred from taking actions which the other side was strongly against. Then 
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn wrote while describing the United 
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States cyber strategy, “it must also recognize that traditional Cold War 
deterrence models of assured retaliation do not apply to cyberspace, where it is 
difficult and time consuming to identify an attack’s perpetrator. Whereas a missile 
comes with a return address, a computer virus generally does not” (Lynn, 2010, 
p. 99). Others have argued that deterrence is effective in cyberspace and the 
lack of large scale cyber attacks between nation-states is a testimony of that 
deterrence (Healey, 2014). That deterrence cannot be expected to prevent all 
cyber attacks, but instead creates a ceiling which nation-states keep their cyber 
attacks under. Given that attribution is not as obvious or easily determined as 
with a kinetic attack, cyber weapons are readily available and can be used by 
non-nation-state actors who are hard to retaliate against, and the difference 
between espionage and a cyber attack is not clear, this paper will view cyber 
coercion from the vantage point of the United States compelling an adversary, 
verses a deterrence model. By applying force, one applies a little pain to 
demonstrate resolve and ability to cause more pain, and hopefully force the 
adversary to take the desired action. However, knowing how and where to apply 
the force is important. This paper will review both what force should be used and 
where to apply it to achieve cyber coercion. 
The supply chain of a military provides for all the needs of the military. 
Weapons, food, and material goods are all made, procured, and supplied using 
supply chains. Finding a weak point within supply chains can allow for the 
opportunity to cause the supply chains to break. Without supply chains, a military 
might not be able to continue to conduct operations. This makes it a good 
candidate for targeting in cyber coercion. However, supply chains may be flexible 
and resilient. Finding weak points that are essential is key to a successful attack. 
This paper will discuss and analyze potential targets within the supply chain. 
Though the desired effect of coercion is for one’s adversary to completely 
give in to the demands, this is not always the outcome. That does not mean the 
coercion failed, though. If a cyber coercion attack brings an adversary to the 
bargaining table that would be a positive benefit. However, does the cyber 
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operation run the risk of escalating hostilities? Could it cause a cyber war to 
break out? Knowing what attack to use and where to apply it is important, but just 
as important is estimating the potential effect of the attack. This paper will review 
possible cyber tools to be used in a cyber coercion operation and discuss where 
those tools would best be applied within the context of targeting military supply 
chains. A heavy focus will be given to reversible tools, cyber weapons that when 
their use is terminated, can restore the status of the data or network to it same 
condition before the attack. This thesis will then apply three of these tools to 
various scenarios targeting different adversarial countries of different military and 
cyber capabilities. The potential response by the adversary will gauge the 
effectiveness of the attack with the adversary capitulating or being driving to the 
negotiating table to be considered positive results, and increased escalations to 
be considered negative results. 
C. APPLICABILITY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
After 14 years at war, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) needs to 
find methods that allow it to exert influence around the world while not 
overexerting the force. In his 2015 State of the Union address, U.S. President 
Barack Obama posed two questions as to the direction of the U.S. power in the 
future, “Will we approach the world fearful and reactive, dragged into costly 
conflicts that strain our military and set back our standing? Or will we lead wisely, 
using all elements of our power to defeat new threats and protect our planet?” 
The cyber methods analyzed in this thesis will allow the United States to defeat 
new threats without costly conflicts exerting their toll on budgets and military 
forces. 
Addressing the students of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 
February 2015, Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) and 
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM), Admiral Michael 
Rogers, said that cyber needs to present a target package to combatant 
commanders illustrating the weapon, the target, the expected damage to the 
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target, and the expected collateral damage. This allows the combatant 
commanders and other decision makers to make the best possible decision of 
what course of action to take for the desired effect. This process takes time and 
effort and cannot be easily done on the fly. This thesis furthers this process for 
cyber, by describing weapons, presenting several potential targets, analyzing the 
damage expected by the weapons, discussing possible collateral damage, and 
reviewing possible and likely responsive courses of action by the adversary. Of 
especial consideration is the use of reversible weapons, which allow the military 
to conduct an attack and quickly, and then restore the target to its pre-attack 
condition. This is not something that can be achieved through kinetic force. 
The use of reversible weapons holds great potential for the military. In the 
aftermath of recent conflicts, the United States has spent large amounts in 
rebuilding infrastructure destroyed in the conflict. For example, in Iraq, over  
$60 billion has been spent in rebuilding infrastructure (Mulrine, 2013). Not only is 
rebuilding costly, but a lengthy or problematic process can cost the hearts and 
minds of the civilians of the adversarial nation. If attacks which could be reversed 
were used, these costs would not only be reduced, since the infrastructure does 
not need to cost as much to rebuild, the ability of the United States to quickly 
restore services after the conflict could improve, and the standing of the United 
States with the citizens improved. Cyber weapons have the potential of being 
able to drive a desired effect, even preventing the use of infrastructure, without 
physically destroying the infrastructure. This is an effect that kinetic weapons do 
not have. Cyber attacks analyzed in this paper will be analyzed for their 
reversibility after the conflict is terminated. 
These same tactics may be used against the United States. The DOD 
needs to understand the effects of such attacks to prepare for defending them. 
Each scenario reviewed will include an analysis of possible effects if such an 
attack were used against the United States. 
Coercion is not a new tactic and is one the military is quite familiar with. 
War has been likened to “organized coercion” (Freedman, 1998). However, 
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coercive methods that can allow the United States to achieve superiority or deny 
adversarial activity in a domain or capacity to accomplish a political objective 
without having to resort to full-scale war are very important. This study will further 
the understanding of cyber coercion for the military by applying three cyber 
coercion operations in a scenario of military context. Given a continuing volatile 
world, cyber coercion allows the U.S. military to project power in ways other than 
kinetic force. 
D. OUTLINE 
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I introduces the study, 
provides the goals and purpose, and provides the relevance to the DOD. Chapter 
II defines cyber coercion and reviews the components of cyber coercion which 
help make it successful. Chapter III reviews various methods of cyber attacks 
which can target the supply chain. Chapter IV analyzes the use of three of the 
methods in three scenarios pitting the United States against an adversary of 
various capabilities. Chapter V concludes the paper, providing a summary of the 
findings and recommending future work.  
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II. DEFINING CYBER COERCION 
A. DEFINING COERCION 
On November 22, 2014, computers at Sony Pictures began displaying 
messages along with images of skulls threatening to release private information 
that had been gained by a hacking group (“The Interview,” 2014). This hacking 
group, called the Guardians of Peace, released compromised Sony Pictures 
emails, unreleased movies, and financial documents, causing embarrassment to 
Sony Pictures and many members of the film industry whose private emails and 
information were displayed publicly. The group then escalated their fight by 
announcing they would conduct terrorist attacks on any movie theater showing 
an upcoming movie, The Interview, a film mocking North Korean leader, Kim 
Jong-un. Citing the terror threats, Sony canceled the release of the movie, which 
President Barack Obama called “a mistake” (Bradner, 2014). Though Sony later 
reversed their position and released the movie in theaters and online, the effect 
of cyber coercion was demonstrated. The FBI attributed the attack back to North 
Korea. President Obama recognized this threat, saying, “if we set a precedent in 
which a dictator in another country can disrupt through cyber, a company’s 
distribution chain or its products, and as a consequence we start censoring 
ourselves, that’s a problem” (Bradner, 2014). 
Coercion is legally defined as “any form of compulsion or constraint which 
compels or induces a person to act otherwise than freely” (Gifis, 1991, p. 78). 
Cyber coercion is the application of coercion to cyberspace. By using cyber 
weapons, one can use, or just threaten to use, cyber force against an adversary 
in an attempt to compel them to take a desired action or not take an undesired 
action. 
The DOD defines cyberspace as “a global domain within the information 
environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications 
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networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers” (DOD, 
2014, p. 59). As more systems utilize cyberspace and the dependence of 
militaries grows, the ability to affect other nations and their militaries by cyber 
methods increases. Coercion, which has been applied in the physical domains in 
warfare, is applied to the cyber domain in cyber warfare. 
Though the Sony Picture example was a nation-state against a private 
company, cyber coercion is not limited to such a relationship and can be between 
many kinds of entities. For this thesis, the potential for cyber coercion between 
two nation-states will be examined.  
In his thesis, Daniel Flemming (2014) reviewed various definitions of 
coercion and demonstrated that for a cyber coercion operation, Schelling’s 
definition best fit. Though Schelling’s work was in the context of the Cold War 
and nuclear war, Flemming walks through the facets of cyber coercion and 
shows that Schelling’s framework of coercion including force and diplomacy, as 
well as compellence and deterrence, still can aid in understanding how to apply 
cyber tactics in a coercive manner. 
Schelling (2008) provides several examples of how coercion might play 
out. Two of the best well-known examples are the “prisoner’s dilemma” and 
“game of chicken.” In the prisoner’s dilemma, it is in the prisoner’s advantage to 
turn on his co-prisoner, for if he does not, but the other does turn on him, he 
loses. But if he does turn on the other prisoner, even if that prisoner reciprocates, 
the end result is better. In the game of chicken, if neither car swerves, then both 
drivers lose. Cyber coercion better fits within the concept of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, given these two concepts of the risks involved in coercion. If two sides 
both have cyber capabilities, it is an advantage for one to act against the other, 
for the risk of not using cyber methods is greater. Given this risk, it is stronger for 
the defense of the United States to explore possible cyber coercive strategies to 
take advantage of other adversaries. 
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As implied by the previous definition, coercion can be active or passive. It 
includes both compellence and deterrence (Schelling, 2008). These two forms of 
coercion will be further defined. 
1. Defining Compellence 
Schelling (2008) defines compellence as an active form of coercion. It 
requires that the coercer take some type of action. Schelling provides an 
illustration of compelling an enemy to retreat from a battlefield by committing 
oneself to an action. He gives an example of setting the grass behind the coercer 
on fire with the wind blowing towards the enemy. This places the coercer in a 
position where they must act to move to compel the enemy to action. 
Compellence places the coercive action in the hands of the coercer. The 
compellence only goes as long as the coercer is applying the force. This is a 
defined action, intended to compel the victim to take the desired action. Within 
the context of cyber, compellence is an applicable form of coercion. The attacker 
makes a move against the victim with the intention that the victim responds. It is 
assumed that the attacker must first make a move to coerce the victim. For this 
thesis, coercion will be viewed from the perspective of compellence. The thesis 
will propose actions against an adversary that could be taken to coerce the 
adversary into making a desired move.  
2. Defining Deterrence 
Schelling defines deterrence as a passive form of coercion (Schelling, 
2008). It does not require that the coercer take some type of action. Schelling 
provides an illustration of placing a car in the way of the adversary’s car. If the 
coercer has placed his car in the way and no longer moves it, it passively serves 
as a deterrent. The adversary must decide if they desire to crash into the car or 
to be deterred and not collide. 
Within the context of cyber operations, the effectiveness of deterrence 
remains disputed. Contributing to the argument that deterrence is not effective in 
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cyberspace is rapidly changing technology, what could be seen as an advantage 
today might be obsolete tomorrow. Furthermore, many cyber attacks are 
effective only while the victim is not aware of the vulnerability being exploited. 
Should a nation-state announce their capability, owners of systems and networks 
would be able to reinforce against the capability, reducing its effectiveness. This 
can be contrasted to nuclear weapons where the announcement of a nuclear 
capability can serve as a deterrent. While the debate continues, the model of 
nuclear deterrence cannot be applied to cyberspace. Thus, this thesis will focus 
on cyber coercion as compellence. 
B. FACTORS OF CYBER COERCION 
To be effective, several factors must be taken into consideration for a 
cyber coercion operation. Military operations required proper planning before 
conducting the attack to minimize the risk of failure. Cyber operations are no 
different. By understanding the factors involved in a cyber coercion operation, the 
chances for success increase. The planner should have a vision of what is 
needed to conduct the attack, an understanding of the expected effect of the 
attack, and an ability to understand the possible responses by the adversary. All 
of these will better enable military and national decision makers in determining 
with method, whether cyber or kinetic, to use in achieving the political objective. 
Those factors to be considered include the goal of the operation, cost of the 
cyber weapon used, the reversibility of the attack, the reusability of the attack, 
and the attribution of the attack. These will now be further defined and discussed. 
1. Goal 
The goal of the cyber coercion operation is to force the adversary to take a 
desired action or to refrain from taking an undesired action; that is, to be coerced 
into behaving in a way favorable for the attacker. To achieve this goal, the proper 
amount of force, or a compelling threat to use such force, must be applied or 
threatened to a target that will cause enough pain to the victim to seek an end to 
the pain. This thesis will look in particular at cyber coercion targeting the supply 
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chain. This was alluded to by the President when he addressed the potential 
effect a nation-state may have by targeting products and product distribution.  
Included with this goal is the desire to not escalate hostilities. Violence for 
the sake of violence or intentionally provoking another to war is never in the best 
interest of a coercer, thus escalating hostilities would not be a means of 
achieving the desired goal. Should a cyber coercive action lead to escalated 
hostilities, it will be assumed that the operation was unsuccessful. 
Another goal would be to minimize collateral effects. As part of the 
planning process for a cyber coercion operation, possible collateral effects need 
to also be anticipated. Collateral effects in cyber are defined as “unintentional or 
incidental effects including, but not limited to, injury or damage to persons or 
objects that would not be lawful military targets under the circumstances ruling at 
the time. Include effects on civilian or dual-use computers, networks, information, 
or infrastructure” (Cartwright, 2010, p. 3). As the Internet is used for both military 
and civilian purposes, the potential exists that an attack could impact non-
military, civilian networks. Though cyber attacks allow for the ability to target a 
specific host, because of the interconnectedness of the Internet, the risk of an 
attack on a specific host or network spreading to another one that isn’t targeted 
exists. An example of the collateral effects that can be caused by a cyber attack 
was that during the Stuxnet attack, believed to be targeting Iranian nuclear 
facilities, 40% of the computers infected with the worm were outside of Iran 
(Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011). Efforts must be taken to understand and minimize 
the risk of such collateral effects. 
The goal of the operation will be the chief driving factor for the attack. If 
the goal was deemed important enough, an expensive attack could be justified 
as necessary to achieve the goal. However, some factors such as the legality of 
the attack could put limits on the operation regardless of the goal. 
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2. Cost 
Cyber weapons, when compared to traditional military weapons, are 
relatively cheap (Lin, Dam, & Owens, 2009). Cyber attacks can be conducted by 
individuals using codes that they either generate themselves or can find online. 
However, for an attack with military precision to achieve a political objective, 
something needed for a cyber coercion operation, there is an increased cost. The 
target must first be studied to understand what is to be targeted and how to 
achieve the goal. This may include reconnaissance on the victim’s network to 
discover vulnerabilities. This requires time and money. Vulnerabilities must then 
be determined and exploits created. 
As vulnerabilities are discovered by computer and software developers, 
patches and fixes are distributed as generated. While some systems may not be 
patched and remain vulnerable, zero-day exploits are preferred for an operation 
to have a high chance of succeeding. Zero-day exploits are exploits in software 
that are unknown to the developer. The development of these exploits is quite 
valuable, and they are less common and more expensive for limited use, 
specialty designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. 
In fact, the U.S. government purchases zero-day exploits from markets 
(Greenberg, 2012) and it has been claimed that in 2013 the National Security 
Agency (NSA) spent over $25 million purchasing zero-day exploits (Fung, 2013). 
However, some program developers will pay if a zero-day exploit is discovered 
and reported to the developer. For example, the HP’s TippingPoint Zero Day 
Initiative pays thousands of dollars to individuals who discover and disclose an 
exploit in software. They then work with vendors and developers to develop and 
release patches to users of the software (“TippingPoint,” n.d.). Other markets 
exist for vulnerabilities as well with brokers who specialize in buying and selling 
zero-day exploits. Estimates of prices for zero-day exploits based on the software 
targeted are shown in Table1. 
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Table 1.   Cost of Zero-Day Exploits (from Greenberg, 2012) 
Target Software Cost Range ($ US) 
Adobe Reader 5,000 – 30,000 
Mac OSX 20,000 – 50,000 
Android 30,000 – 60,000 
Flash of Java Browser Plug-ins 40,000 – 100,000 
Microsoft Word 50,000 – 100,000 
Microsoft Windows 60,000 – 120,000 
Firefox or Safari 60,000 – 150,000 
Chrome or Internet Explorer 80,000 – 200,000 
IOS 100,000 – 250,000 
 
Other costs of using exploits exist as well, such as the reverse 
engineering of code or hardware to find vulnerabilities, development of systems 
necessary to conduct certain cyber attacks, and the salaries of personnel needed 
to operate and oversee this process. For example, the fiscal year 2015 DOD 
budget proposal requested over $5 billion to fund cyber operations across the 
entire force (DOD, 2014). Comparatively though, these cyber attacks are 
cheaper than traditional kinetic attacks. Though $5 billion for cyber is significant, 
the total request by the DOD was nearly $500 billion for the entire department. A 
single Tomahawk cruise missile costs around $569,000 per missile (“Tomahawk 
Fact Sheet,” 2014) not including the cost of the platform necessary to launch the 
missile. In determining the method to achieve the effect, such costs will be 
important to decision makers.  
3. Reversibility 
It would be desirable for any attacks to be reversible, that is, to be able to 
undo any damage caused at the termination of hostilities. A reversible cyber 
attack would be an attack that allows the target to be restored to its original state 
by the attacker. Such an attack has potential for several reasons. Reversible 
attacks on mistaken targets such as civilian infrastructure can be terminated and 
services restored without causing permanent damage and minimizing collateral 
effects. Collateral damage could be caused by attacking the wrong system or 
network or by a self-propagating attack, such as a worm, spreading to other 
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hosts and networks beyond the target. Cyber attacks which do not cause death 
or injury to people or permanent damage to infrastructure also serve as a more 
ethical form of fighting (Rowe, 2010). 
This also allows an attacker to adjust their attack after the initial attack. In 
his paper, Rowe offers the option that an attacker could undo portions of an 
attack if the attack is deemed to be an over-proportionate attack (Rowe, 2010). 
This is useful in coercion as an attack could be scaled back if it was believed that 
the attack by the coercer was too strong and would elicit a counter-attack. Rowe 
also argues that time should be considered in discussing reversibility as some 
attacks may take a longer time to reverse. He proposes several techniques, one 
of which is discussed in the thesis, namely cryptographic attacks that encrypt 
data to prevent its access by the victim. 
The ability of the attacker to reverse the damage caused by the attack is 
an option provided by cyber warfare tactics that is not afforded to commanders 
by traditional kinetic weapons. With traditional weapons, after hostilities cease, 
infrastructure damaged or destroyed must be repaired or rebuilt, adding 
considerable costs and time. But by using reversible attacks, commanders can 
achieve a desired effect while being able to adjust the damage caused by the 
attack, a way of minimizing collateral effects after they have been incidentally 
attacked, and a way of quickly restoring infrastructure after hostilities. 
4. Reusability 
For this thesis, the reusability of a cyber weapon is defined as the ability to 
use the same cyber weapon against the same adversary multiple times with the 
same likelihood of success. Few kinetic weapons have the expectation that once 
the weapon is used against an adversary, its usefulness is decreased. However, 
this is true with many cyber weapons since once the vulnerability being exploited 
is known to the victim, the victim can take steps to lessen the vulnerability and 
prevent a repeat of the attack. 
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Because of the problems of reusability, zero-day exploits are very 
valuable. They increase the likelihood of the success of an attack, since the 
weakness is not known to the developer or the targeted victim. Bilge and 
Dumitras (2012) determined that a zero-day attack lasts on average for 312 days 
before the vulnerability is secured. (These are civilian attacks, however, and a 
military attack will likely encourage a faster response.) Though the weapon may 
be rendered ineffective within a few days after use, during the time period it is 
effective the adversary can enjoy access to an otherwise inaccessible network or 
system and have access not enjoyed by other potential adversaries. The ability 
to reuse the attack during this time frame may be enough to achieve the political 
objective. The lack of reusability does not necessarily impede the effectiveness 
of the attack for a cyber coercion operation. 
If an attack can be used multiple times, its value is increased as the attack 
can be continually successful without having to utilize additional zero-day 
exploits. This requires finding a vulnerability or technique that is not easily 
defended against. If a cyber weapon was created which had reusability even with 
the full disclosure of the attack, the deterrence portion of coercion would become 
feasible for cyber coercion. However, given that cyber attacks currently remain 
defendable once the vulnerability is disclosed, this thesis will look at reusability in 
terms of compellence. 
5. Legality 
Legality of warfare in cyberspace remains ill-defined. In his “Advance 
Questions for Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN,” the then-nominee for 
CDRUSCYBERCOM cited this lack of a precise legal definition of warfare in 
cyberspace as an issue in conducting operations in cyberspace (Advanced 
Questions, 2014). In it, he wrote that while the DOD has a set of criteria for the 
use of force in cyberspace and is in accordance with Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter, there remains no international agreement on what constitutes 
the use of force and one does not appear to be likely in the future. What 
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constitutes an attack is still not well defined. In the September 2014 Wales 
Summit declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced 
that cyber threats were a growing concern and could be as harmful as 
conventional attacks, saying “A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to 
the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a 
case-by-case basis,” which in part highlights the ambiguity of what defines a 
cyber attack (NATO, 2014, para. 72). As precise DOD criteria are classified, this 
thesis will use the Tallinn Manual as a start for determining legal status of various 
cyber operations (Tallinn, 2013). As the legality of cyber warfare is not codified 
by international laws or treaties, the Tallinn Manual seeks to provide guidance by 
analogy to current international laws of warfare. 
The Tallinn manual is a non-binding study, commissioned by NATO’s 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, on how international law, 
especially jus ad bellum, or the law of conflict management, and jus in bello, the 
law of war, can be applied to cyber warfare. It recognized that some current 
customary international laws and international norms would apply to cyberspace; 
however, unique aspects of cyberspace would require additional efforts to fit 
them to the norms. The Tallinn manual sought to bridge this gap. This thesis will 
use the Tallinn definitions for what constitutes a cyber attack and discuss how 
proposed cyber coercion operations could avoid being so viewed in light of the 
laws of law of armed conflict. 
6. Attribution 
In May 2014, the DOJ indicted 5 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
military officers belonging to Unit 61398 of the 3rd on 31 counts of violating U.S. 
law including the alleged hacking and economic espionage of six U.S. 
corporations (DOJ, 2014). Attorney General Eric Holder said that this was an 
important indictment as it was the first time charges had been brought up against 
hackers acting on behalf of a nation-state. The United States claimed they were 
 16 
able to attribute illegal cyber activity to not only a specific nation-state, but to 
specific individuals operating on the other side of the keyboard. 
Attribution of attacks is difficult to prove in cyber warfare compared to 
other domains. In the traditional warfare domains of land, air, and maritime, 
attribution can be determined by following where the attackers came from or 
evidence on the ground. For example, during the Iraq War, the United States 
repeatedly claimed that Iranian forces were involved in improvised explosive 
attacks on coalition forces, claims which Iran denied. However, the United States 
was able to produce hard evidence in the form of captured Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps Qods Force members and weapons with markings traceable to 
Iranian arms factories (Glanz, 2007). Traceable markings and captured 
personnel are not usually available in cyber warfare, especially given the use of 
proxies and forging of IP addresses. Because of this, anonymous attacks are 
possible, making it difficult for a victim to know who attacked them or prove a 
possible attacker was the culprit. 
In the previously discussed Sony Pictures hack, the FBI claimed they 
could trace the attack back to North Korea. While the FBI cited national security 
reasons for not releasing all of the evidence used in the attribution, they did cite 
three key clues (FBI, 2014). The malware used in the attack showed similarities 
to previously known malware developed by North Korea, IP addresses 
hardcoded in the malware had links to known North Korean communications 
infrastructure, and some of the tools used in the attack were similar to a North 
Korean cyber attack on South Korea in 2013. This public claim of attribution, 
however, did not occur until December 19th; nearly a month after the attack was 
reported to the FBI by Sony. This can be contrasted with the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the United States in which by September 20th, President George W. 
Bush had publicly announced that al Qaeda was behind the attack (Bush, 2001). 
The difficultly in attribution means that some large cyberattacks have gone 
unattributed. Despite their high profile, the 2007 cyber attack against Estonia, the 
2008 cyber attack against Georgia, and the Stuxnet cyber attack against Iran 
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have all remained publicly unattributed to a nation-state, beyond unofficial leaks, 
despite their publicity and supposed connections to various nation-states. 
This gives an advantage to attackers who wish to attack a victim with 
minimal fear of retribution. A nation-state, or even non-nation-state actors, can 
conduct a cyber attack, achieve the desired damage, and have a reasonable 
expectation of not having the attack attributed to them and escaping reprisal. 
This is useful in espionage, when attribution of the activity is not desired. 
However, what if a nation-state wanted to publicly attribute an attack to 
themselves? What if a nation-state not only conducted a cyber attack, but 
publicly announced that they were responsible for it? Intentional attribution is 
seen by some groups such an Anonymous and the Syrian Electronic Army. 
However, these are not organized groups and permit anonymity of the individual 
members. They can publicly claim to be behind an attack to gain notoriety while 
keeping their identification unknown. 
A nation-state might intentionally self-attribute an attack if they were to 
gain something by it such as political leverage. This could be done by a public 
announcement, though this would only be supported by the attacker’s word and 
the perceived credibility of the claim. Another possible way might be to embed 
the attribution within the attack. Such a method could be steganography. 
Steganography, meaning “covered writing,” is hiding of information to prevent 
detection of even the presence of information (Johnson & Jajoda, 1998). By 
embedding some type of signature within the attack, the attacker could prove 
their responsibility for it. By attributing the attack to themselves, the attacker can 
demonstrate their ability to conduct an attack and could cause the victim to fear 
another attack, increasing the effectiveness of the attack (Rowe, 2010). It would 
also clarify what kind of response the coercer desires. It would allow the attacker 
to better coerce the victim, having demonstrated their ability to apply pain in the 
form of an attack. Rowe also proposed that cyber attacks containing attribution 
would be more ethical. This would be akin to soldiers in combat being required to 
wear the uniform of the nation they are serving. Hare proposed that for 
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compellence in cyberspace to work, the coercer must have the assurance that 
the victim has attributed the attack correctly, that the victim understands what 
action they are being attacked for, and that the victim knows what actions must 
be taken to end the pain being suffered (2012). Given these arguments, 
attribution may not only have benefits in coercion, but be required to compel 
one’s adversary. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Cyber coercion is both a strategy and tactic that is worth the United States 
exploring and utilizing. Using Schelling’s model of prisoner’s dilemma, it would 
put the United States at a disadvantage to not use cyber coercion strategies 
where appropriate. However, they must be used in terms of the political 
objectives set out by the United States and in accordance with international laws 
and norms. 
Cyber coercion is active. It places the coercer on the offense. The 
coercive actions analyzed within these operations will be offensive in nature, 
meaning that they will not be a cyber posturing by the coercer, but an offensive 
move, sometimes defined as an attack. 
While parallels can be drawn from other domains, cyber coercion 
operations are unique in their ability to drive effects in terms of cost, reversibility, 
reusability, and legal status. These unique attributes require a deeper look to 
understand how cyber coercive strategies might be used by the United States It 
may be found that in many situations, using cyber coercive actions will be more 
effective, cheaper, and a cleaner way of fighting than alternative approaches. 
These same factors, however, also mean that cyber coercion is of strategic 
significance for our adversaries. Analysis of cyber coercion will help us to 
understand how our defense cyber capabilities must be placed strategically to 
minimize the risk of the United States being cyber coerced. 
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III. METHODS OF CYBER ATTACKS TARGETING THE SUPPLY 
CHAIN 
A. TARGETING THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
The supply chain that supports a military presents an opportunistic target 
for cyber coercion operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) in Joint 
Publication (JP) 1-02, the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
defines the supply chain as “the linked activities associated with providing 
materiel from a raw material stage to an end user as a finished product” (2014, p. 
239). This is overseen by supply-chain management, defined as “a cross-
functional approach to procuring, producing, and delivering products and 
services to customers” (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 239). For the militaries, 
the supply chain is crucial. Military supply chains consist of military and 
commercial supply, maintenance, and distribution components to provide 
materiel and logistic services to its military force. The goal, as defined by the 
DOD in JP 4-09, Distribution Operations, is “to maximize force readiness while 
optimizing the allocation of limited resources” (2013, p. x). If this component of a 
military was disrupted, it can drastically negatively affect the ability of a military to 
wage warfare. 
1. Description of the Supply Chain 
All supply chains will vary in their structure to support the acquisition of the 
product. However, there are some commonalities among supply chains. There 
are five main parts of a typical supply chain: customers, retailers, 
wholesalers/distributors, manufacturers, and component/raw material suppliers 
(Chopra & Meindl, 2004). For a military supply chain, the customer is the end 
user of the product being provided who is using it in support of the objectives of 
the military. The need generated by the end user and its delivery of the product 
to the end user are the driving factors of the supply chain. Retailers in the context 
of the military may include commanders and units which oversee the operations 
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of the end user. The distributors may include military and commercial distributors 
who oversee the procurement of the product from the manufacturers and the 
delivery to the units or end user. The manufacturers include military and 
commercial producers of the product. The raw-material suppliers provide the 
necessary material goods to the manufacturers for the manufacturing of the 
desired product. As supply chains overlap and can be complex, a disruption 
anywhere within a chain can have cascading effects in denying the ability of the 
product to be delivered to the end user. If the product targeted is of sufficient 
critical necessity to the military, it may inhibit the ability of a military to conduct its 
desired operations. 
Military supply chains have traditionally been protected from foreign 
influence due to critical components being internal to the force. However, with the 
advent of the Internet, supply chains have grown increasingly dependent on the 
Internet for communications and coordination between components (Hageman, 
Harper, Sagan, & Weyman, 2010). The global reach of the Internet creates an 
opportunity for cyber operations to reach and influence supply-chain operations. 
As other countries use the Internet to supply their supply chains, this provides 
opportunities for the cyber forces of the United States to be able to directly affect 
key aspects of adversarial supply chain operation (Hageman et al., 2010). 
2. Reason for Targeting the Supply Chain 
As a potential application of cyber coercion is to prevent hostilities from 
occurring, causing disruption of the supply chain may be a way to prevent a 
military from fighting. Sun Tzu said, “For to win one hundred victories in one 
hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is 
the acme of skill” (Tzu, 1963, p.77).The ability to disrupt supply chains via cyber 
attacks as a form of cyber coercion has the ability to fulfill Sun Tzu’s advice, by 
achieving victory without fighting. It reduces the risk to American service 
members and the costs associated with combat operations, allowing the United 
States to exert greater influence in the world at a lower expense. 
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An example of how a single part of the supply chain can have an effect on 
combat forces is seen by the United States military’s Hellfire missile. The AGM-
114 Hellfire missile is an air-to-surface missile that has been used extensively in 
military operations since being first used in Operation Just Cause. It is the 
primary antitank weapon system of the U.S. Army and initially designed by the 
United States as a helicopter launched missile, it has been adapted for use on 
fixed-wing aircraft, ground units, and shipborne use against a wide-variety of 
targets (“AGM-114 Hellfire Employment,” n.d.; Munoz, 2014). It was used heavily 
in Operation Desert Shield with an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Hellfire missiles 
fired. It has continued to be used in operations in all theaters of combat in the 
global war on terror such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen (“AGM-114 Hellfire 
Employment,” n.d.; Mazzetti, Schmitt, & Worth, 2011). However, the supply chain 
for the Hellfire missile is a weak point. The missile uses a solid-fuel propellant 
which is made using 1,2,4 butanetriol. The United States is dependent upon one 
Chinese company for the production of this vital chemical. A disruption in the 
supply chain for this component could cause the United States to be denied use 
of this weapon which has become a workhorse for the military (Adams, 2013). 
Finding a similar weak point in the supply chain for an adversary’s military 
forces could place their military in a position where, because its supply chain for 
a vital military weapon system was disrupted, it would not be advantageous for it 
to begin or continue hostilities. In this way, an operation against the supply chain 
could prevent combat operations from ever having to take place, achieving 
political objectives without the risk to the lives of military forces and the expense 
of fighting a war. 
A weakness in a military supply chain affecting operations was seen in the 
2003 invasion of Iraq which limited the ability of the U.S. Army to support units 
with food, ammunition, and needed supplies. This was caused by the 
communication network for the supply chain being inadequate. Using legacy 
systems combined with fielding new Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
tracking tags, the Army found it difficult to track supplies once they were in Iraq 
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and unable to reroute supplies if a unit moved locations. As a result, some units 
had to resort to pillaging enemy supplies to support their operations (Songini, 
2004).While this was not an attack against a supply chain, it shows the affect that 
degradation in the communication portions of the supply chain can cause. If this 
were a coordinated attack, the attacker could have targeted and exploited these 
weaknesses in the communications portion of the supply chain to greatly magnify 
the effect of the supply chain issues had in delaying or denying the delivery of 
necessary supplies to military end users. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF CYBER ATTACKS 
Effective cyber attacks against the supply chain need to disrupt it in a 
manner that convinces the adversary to not escalate hostilities and to comply 
with the demands of a coercer. Developing the cyber attacks would require 
determining the target network, conducting initial reconnaissance on the target, 
developing the attack, gaining access to the network, maintaining the attack, and 
terminating the attack.  
There are many attacks that can be used to achieve the purpose of cyber 
coercion on a supply chain. Several types of attacks can be considered given 
their targeting, including those that target network communications, the 
manufacturing process, and databases. For each of these attacks, the factors of 
cyber coercion will be analyzed. The goal of the attack will be reviewed in terms 
of what success might look like. The cost of the attack will be discussed in terms 
of development and execution. Given the desirability for any attacks to be 
reversible, this ability for each attack described will be reviewed. The ability of the 
attack to be used multiple times will be discussed. In considering the legality of 
attacks, the Tallinn Manual will be reviewed to consider whether it is a cyber 
attack which violates a nation’s sovereignty as the primary consideration. While 
attribution is an important consideration, this will be left for the scenarios in 
Chapter IV. 
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1. Targeting Network Communications 
Network communications are essential in supply chains. The integration of 
computer systems within supply chains for data storage and communications has 
created a dependence of the supply chain on computer networks. The leading 
reasons computer networks are used within supply chains are for managing 
demand information, the flow of physical goods, financial information, and 
ordering (Warren & Hutchinson, 2000). As these are important factors in supply 
chains, targeting the networks can disrupt the supply chain’s ability to deliver 
products to end users. 
Targeting the network would require reconnaissance to determine the 
services to be denied to drive the desired affect against the adversary. This 
would then lead to targeting the network and routers to deny access to the 
intended services. 
In targeting networks, routers are a component that could be a force 
multiplier for an attack, if brought under control. Routers are used to connect 
networks and to route traffic along a network path to a final destination (Baker, 
1995).By targeting a router, one can cause effects against more than just an 
individual host or hosts, to affect all hosts on a given network and even other 
networks as traffic transmits across the Internet via routers. 
This category of cyber attack methods is quite broad as there are many 
different attacks that can be used against routers and the networks utilizing these 
routers. For this analysis, the four broad categories of Internet infrastructure 
attacks, as categorized by Chakrabarti and Manimara (2002), will be reviewed. 
These four broad categories are domain name system (DNS) hacking, routing-
table poisoning, packet mistreatment, and denial of service (DOS). 
a. DNS Hacking 
In a DNS attack, the DNS is manipulated with false information to disrupt, 
redirect, or deny traffic on the network. The DNS serves as the phonebook for 
the Internet. It is a distributed hierarchical directory which maps fully qualified 
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domain names to IP addresses, which are used by computers and routers to 
route network traffic (Chakrabarti & Manimara, 2002). Many local networks 
include DNS servers which resolve queries from local users.  
One potential attack is to poison the DNS by compromising the DNS 
server and modifying records stored on the server. When a user attempts to go 
to a website and the DNS query is conducted to resolve the domain name, the IP 
address returned is the address from the record stored on the server. Modifying 
this record allows the attacker to redirect traffic to an alternative IP address. 
Another potential attack is to spoof a DNS server on a network. By 
spoofing the DNS server, the attacker is able to control all data distributed in the 
DNS response to queries given to the server.  
The desired outcome of these attacks in a cyber-coercion attack against 
an adversary’s supply chain would include denial of service or redirecting traffic. 
Denial of service would be achieved by preventing a user from being able to use 
the DNS to resolve host name to IP address look-ups, potentially denying them 
the ability to navigate to a desired site providing specific services of the supply 
chain, such as Websites containing information on inventory or entering in data 
or communications between systems within the supply chain. Redirecting traffic 
could be achieved by sending replies that contain a false address of a requested 
name. The attacker could then create a false service at the specified IP address 
that mimics the desired service, and could be designed so that the victim uses 
the service without knowing it has been compromised. 
An example of this occurred in a 2014 attack where routers commonly 
used in small offices or home offices had their DNS settings changed to use a 
malicious DNS. Hundreds of thousands of routers were observed to have had 
their DNS settings changed by malicious code inserted using a Cross-Site 
Request Forgery (CSRF) technique. Though the purpose behind this attack was 
undetermined, the malicious DNS could direct users to fake Websites in an 
attempt to steal credentials (Team Cymru’s Threat Intelligence Group, 2013). 
 26 
b. Targeting Router Tables 
The routing table is used by routers to determine the path that packets 
should be forwarded along from the router. Contaminating the information found 
in this table can cause suboptimal routing, congestion in the network, and denial 
of service on the network. In a router table poisoning attack, the routing table of a 
router is intentionally given incorrect information. This table is populated by 
information that is passed between routers. By compromising a router, an 
attacker can send false updates to neighbor routers. In an attack on networks 
using link-state routing protocol, a router under the control of an attacker could 
advertise a fake link, delete existing links, or change the cost of a link. In 
networks using distance vector routing protocol, the attack could advertise wrong 
distance vectors which would be accepted by neighboring routers and 
propagated throughout the network. By doing so, the attacker can manipulate the 
path that traffic will take on the network. The traffic could be routed to go through 
the malicious router, allowing the attack to view or modify the data, or the traffic 
could be routed in a manner that increases congestion or causes denial of 
service.  
An example of this type of attack occurred in 2008 when the Pakistani 
government ordered ISP’s to block YouTube access. After the government 
ordered ISPs to censor the website, Pakistan Telecom began advertising a route 
for IP addresses used by YouTube. This was an attempt to intentionally poison 
routing tables to reroute traffic destined for YouTube to the provider where the 
traffic would be dropped. It was used to attempt to prevent people from within 
Pakistan from accessing the site; however, the false advertisement was made 
global, resulting in YouTube being blocked worldwide for over two hours. This 
advertisement by Pakistan Telecom was sent to an upstream ISP, PCCW, where 
it was advertised to the rest of the Internet al.l traffic to YouTube was then routed 
to Pakistan Telecom where it was dropped. This continued for nearly two hours 
before the malicious entry in the routing tables was discovered and blocked by 
PCCW (RIPE NCC, 2008). 
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c. Packet Mistreatment Attack 
A packet mistreatment attack occurs when a data packet is captured by an 
attacker and maliciously treated in processing. The packet could be modified with 
the data being changed to either manipulate data within the supply chain or to 
prevent data from being transferred across the network. Packets could be 
duplicated and used in a replay attack against a network. If conducted from a 
compromised router, the router could be used to drop or misroute the packets. 
These attacks are harder to detect, but usually less effective than other attacks 
(Chakrabarti & Manimara, 2002) 
d. Denial of Service Attacks 
A denial of service (DOS) attack prevents users from using services of a 
victim’s system. This is done by attempting to consume the bandwidth of the 
victim’s network being targeted, consuming CPU resources of the victim’s host 
by forcing the host to process false traffic, and denying access to the victim’s 
services being hosted (Patrikakis, Masikos, & Zouraraki, 2004). Numerous 
methods are used to create this desired effect. Some common or historic 
methods include HTTP GET flood, ping flood, “ping of death,” Smurf attack, and 
SYN flood.  
An HTTP GET flood attack uses standard HTTP GET method to 
overwhelm the resources of a server. The GET method requests that the server 
retrieve and transmit the requested data (Fielding & Reschke, 2014). The attack 
overwhelms the server resources by flooding the server with these requests. 
Using the GET method makes the packets used in this attack hard to distinguish 
from legitimate traffic. 
A ping is a network administration utility which sends an Internet Control 
Message Protocol (ICMP) echo request to a host. The host then responds with 
an ICMP echo to the source IP address. In a malicious attack, multiple hosts can 
be used to amplify the attack. In a ping flood attack, multiple hosts send pings to 
a specific victim, forcing the victim to use resources to respond to the requests. 
 28 
The desired effect of the attack would be to use enough hosts against the victim 
to consume the ingoing and outgoing bandwidth of the victim’s network and to 
consume enough CPU cycles in processing the requests to slow down the 
victim’s system. 
The “ping of death” attempts to crash IP devices by sending a large 
packet. In accordance with RFC 791, the maximum size of an IP packet is 
65,535 bytes (Postel, 1981). However, the data link layer usually has a smaller 
maximum size for each frame called the maximum transmission unit (MTU). To 
allow for this difference, packets are fragmented into smaller packets on the data 
link layer. Once the fragmented packets are received by the host, they are 
reconstructed. If a ping request is transmitted with 65508 bytes of data, the 
packet could be properly fragmented to meet the MTU, and the illegal size of the 
packet would not be discovered until reconstructed by the receiving victim’s host. 
This could overflow memory buffers and cause undefined behavior by the 
victim’s machine. 
A Smurf attack attempts to amplify a ping attack by maliciously using 
hosts found on a network. A modified ping request is sent to the broadcast 
network address of the network to be used for the attack. The broadcast network 
address is an address from which all hosts on a network can receive traffic 
(Mogul, 1984).The ping request is crafted to include the victim’s IP as the source 
IP address, and then sent by the attacker to the network broadcast address. 
When each host on the network receives the ping request, it responds with a 
ping reply to the host identified in the source IP address, which is the victim. The 
victim is then flooded with ping replies from all the hosts that responded to the 
ping request. This attack has been mitigated by recommendations to router 
settings in RFC 2644 (Senie, 1999). 
Another example of a DOS attack is a SYN Flood. A SYN Flood occurs by 
not completing the TCP three-way handshake. When establishing a TCP 
connection, the client transmits a SYN message to the host. The host then 
responds with a SYN-ACK message. The client completes the connection 
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establishment by sending an ACK message. The vulnerability exists when a 
client sends the initial SYN message, the host replies with the SYN-ACK 
message, but then the client never transmits an ACK message. This creates a 
half-open connection. The client will often have a time-out associated with these 
connections to terminate the half-open connection if it does not complete within a 
certain amount of time. By continually creating many of these half-open 
connections using different, spoofed source IP addresses, an attacker can 
consume client resources resulting in additional incoming connections being 
denied (“TCP SYN Flooding,” 2000). Publicized in a hacker magazine called 
Phrack in 1996, this attack was used against Panix, an Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) in New York. The attack targeted various servers including Web and mail, 
causing outages which prevented legitimate traffic from accessing the servers 
(Eddy, 2007; Patrikakis, Masikos, & Zouraraki, 2004).Since then, mitigations 
have been recommended to limit the threat of SYN flooding, but the attack still 
demonstrates the effect of a simple DOS attack can have. 
These types of attacks can be amplified by using more than one host to 
attack in a distributed denial of service (DDOS). A DDOS attack is used to 
prevent the victim from doing their desired work (Internet Architecture Board, 
2006). The related idea of a botnet could be useful to control potentially 
thousands of hosts to attack a specific host with. A botnet is a collection of 
compromised computers which can be controlled by an attacker for malicious 
purposes, such as spam email or denial of service attacks. For example, one 
botnet in 2008 called Srizbi was estimated to contain around 315,000 computers 
and could send 60 billion emails per day (Keizer, 2008). Using a distributed 
attack also makes the attack harder to deter. With the attack coming from 
potentially thousands of vectors, it is difficult for network administrators to identify 
the source of the attack to mitigate. This increases the potential for the attack to 
be successful and have a longer duration.  
A botnet is typically created by compromising hosts by injecting malware 
into the host. The host then runs the malware and joins the botnet. The infected 
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hosts on the botnet communicate with a controller that provides the commands 
for the intended activity of the botnet. The controller then provides maintenance 
and upgrades to the botnet as necessary (Zhu, Lu, Chen, Fu, Roberts, & Han, 
2008). 
The duration of a DDOS attack will vary based on how long the attack is 
staged by the attacker and how long it takes for the victim to observe and 
respond to the attack. Akamai, a company that specializes in minimizing global 
DDOS attacks, estimated that DDOS attacks in quarter four of 2014 had an 
average duration of 29 hours, up from 22 hours the previous quarter (Akamai, 
2015). 
e. Costs 
Network attacks are quite cheap. These types of attacks are 
commonplace as they can be conducted by anyone with access to the Internet 
and the code necessary to conduct such attacks is readily available. 
Creating a botnet requires time, resources, and exploits. To create a 
botnet for which the attacker had full control of would require purchasing, 
modifying, controlling, and maintaining thousands or millions of hosts. To create 
a botnet using hosts found on the Internet would require an exploit which could 
compromise a host. Kits for purchase online exist to help facilitate the creating of 
a botnet, lowering the barrier to entry (Wilson, 2010). Given the effort needed to 
create and maintain a botnet and the prevalence of botnets already in existence, 
it might be desirable to use botnets already in existence. Some hacker groups 
already rent out their botnets. Computer security company Damballa found that 
the typical rate for renting a DDOS botnet was around $200 for 10,000 hosts in a 
botnet per day (Ollman, 2009). This amount varied based on the size of the 
botnet rented and location of the hosts. Another possible way of creating a botnet 
is using JavaScript embedded on Websites using an online advertising service 
(Greene, 2013). Researchers at White Hat Labs were able to create a million-bot 
botnet by placing malicious JavaScript within ads. They then paid for the ads to 
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be seen on the Internet. While a user’s browser was on the website with the 
malicious ad, it was executing the JavaScript which targeted a Web server to 
attempt to overwhelm it. The test was successful and the cost of the botnet was 
about $150. 
f. Reversibility 
While terminating this attack is easy, reversing any effects of it are not 
reversible. Terminating the attack will allow the network to recover, but any 
damage caused by the network being down cannot be expected to be 
recoverable, including communications that were attempted. Depending on the 
network affected, this can have various levels of affect. 
g. Reusability 
Using this attack does reveal what method was used. The victim could be 
able to harden their network to deny the coercer from reusing this type of attack. 
IP addresses utilized may now be blocked from accessing the target network. If a 
botnet was utilized, discovery of the botnet may lead to its compromise. Given 
that no network is ‘DDOS proof,’ other DDOS methods could be used, but the 
level of attack needed to cause the denial-of-service is elevated. 
h. Legality 
The legality of a network attack is not conclusive. Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter prohibits nation-states from using or threatening to use force against 
other states during peacetime. In applying this to cyberspace, Rule 10 of the 
Tallinn Manual prohibits cyber operations which would be considered a threat or 
use of force against a nation-state (Schmitt, 46). However, the definition of the 
“use of force” is ambiguous. Rule 11 attempts to define the use of force, 
comparing the size and effect of the attack to a non-cyber operation (Schmitt, 
2013). As mentioned in the discussion of this rule, a DOS attack is not likely to be 
classified as a use of force, thus not an act of war. However, the potential for a 
victim to classify it as a use of force exists, given the ambiguity of the definition of 
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use of force. Due to the potential for severe unintended consequences which 
could elevate the perspective of the global community that the attack constitutes 
the use of force, caution must be taken by the attacker to ensure collateral 
damage is minimized. 
When states are at war, the use of force and conduct of armed attacks is 
governed by the law of war. To apply this to cyberspace, the Tallinn Manual 
defines a cyber attack as “a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that 
is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or 
destruction to objects” (Schmitt, 2013, p. 92). Although attacks on a network are 
not normally physically destructive, they can be. Moreover, they may have 
unintended physical consequences. An attack on a network such as a network 
support air-traffic control could cause destruction and potential loss of life.  
The use of rented botnets would likely violate Rule 32, the prohibition on 
attacking civilians given the process of acquiring the bots by maliciously taking 
over computer hosts (Schmitt, 2013). Though the hosts used to make up a botnet 
are not known, it can be assumed that computers used by civilians make up a 
significant portion of bots (hosts) in a botnet and this would constitute targeting 
civilian objects. These civilian objects would then be used by the military for an 
attack without user consent and opening the civilian object up to reprisal attacks. 
2. Targeting the Manufacturing Process 
 
The manufacturing process of the supply chain also poses a potential 
target for cyber attacks involved in cyber coercion. Military forces depend on 
technical parts and equipment which must be manufactured. This may include 
parts manufactured by either military controlled production plants or by 
contracted manufactures. 
Two parts of the manufacturing process serve as potential targets for a 
cyber coercion operation, the industrial-control systems that control the 
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equipment used in manufacturing and the end product. The manufacturing 
portion of the supply chain is relevant not just before hostilities, but also during 
hostilities. This justifies targeting of the manufacturing process 
a. Targeting SCADA Systems 
Industrial-control systems used to remotely control manufacturing 
equipment are an opportunity for a cyber-coercion attack to disrupt the 
manufacturing part of the supply chain. SCADA systems control remote 
operations of and data flow from control devises used in the manufacturing 
process. Many of these systems connect to the Internet or use wireless protocols 
for network communications, allowing access for an attacker. Zhu, Joseph, and 
Sastry (2011) provide a taxonomy of attacks against SCADA systems divided 
into three groups: cyber attacks on hardware, cyber attacks on software, and 
attacks on the communication stack.  
A cyber attack on the hardware of the SCADA system could involve an 
attacker gaining access to a device and maliciously changing its set points or 
manipulating operator displays to prevent their observation of equipment 
malfunction. This could cause the system to not behave as expected by causing 
devices to fail or causing an operator to be misinformed of the current operating 
status of the equipment. An example of an attack like this occurred in 2000 when 
a disgruntled employee attacked the Maroochy, Queensland, Australia sewage 
equipment SCADA system (Abrams & Weiss, 2008). The employee attacked the 
system 46 times, manipulating the equipment, disabling alarms, and causing 
over 200,000 gallons of raw sewage to be released into ponds and streams. The 
attacker launched his attack from his vehicle which he had loaded with the 
necessary radio equipment. This attack highlights the vulnerability of SCADA 
systems and shows the effect of such an attack by even an individual attacker 
operating with knowledge of the targeted system and equipment to exploit the 
system. 
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A cyber attack on software could target the software necessary for the 
SCADA system to meet its functionality demands. Targeting the software can 
have an effect on databases, technical data needed for control algorithms, and 
business functions. Many control applications were written in the C programming 
language which contains several known vulnerabilities that could serve as 
vectors into the SCADA software systems such as buffer overflows. VxWorks is a 
popular embedded operating system. Because it operates all applications as 
kernel tasks, all tasks are run with the highest privileges. This could allow a 
malicious user to gain privileged access to other programs on the device. 
Another software target is the database. Gaining access to the software could 
allow the attacker to modify or delete order or product information (Warren & 
Hutchinson, 2000) 
A successful targeting of SCADA systems occurred with the Stuxnet 
attack, revealed in 2010 in use against Iran. The Stuxnet worm was designed to 
target a Siemens SCADA computer system which was used in the Iranian 
nuclear-fuel enrichment program (Hounshell, 2010). It is believed that Stuxnet 
was written to target the Iranian nuclear program, as 60% of the infected 
computers were discovered in Iran (McMillan, 2010).The worm exploited 
Windows vulnerabilities by means of four zero-day attacks to gain access. The 
program then determined if the infected computer contained the Siemens 
software being targeted. If the computer did not contain of the targeted software, 
the program became inert. If it did contain Simatic WinCC, the worm would 
attempt to reach back to a command and control server to download the latest 
version of the code. It then targeted the Siemens SCADA systems via additional 
zero-day attacks. The program monitored the targeted system and used the 
intelligence gathered to gain control of centrifuges used in the nuclear-fuel 
enrichment processes. The speed of the centrifuges was varied by the program, 
causing the centrifuges to physically break. To confuse the operators of the 
industrial system, the program feed false information to the controllers, 
preventing the operators from knowing of any issues until the centrifuge was 
 35 
broken (Kushner, 2013). One of the ways that the Stuxnet worm propagated was 
via thumb drives (McMillan, 2010). This enabled the worm to gain access to 
networks not accessible to the Internet. 
Though the full extent of the Stuxnet virus has not been reported, it is 
believed that it may have destroyed around 20% of the centrifuges used by Iran 
in their enrichment program (Kelley, 2013).It is also possible that Stuxnet 
destroyed around 1,000 centrifuges at the enrichment plant in Natanz, Iran 
(Albright, Brannan, & Warlond, 2010). This attack demonstrated the damage that 
a cyber attack can cause by targeting SCADA systems. Cyber security expert 
Ralph Langer said Stuxnet “changed global military strategy in the 21st century” 
(Kelley, 2013). 
b. Targeting End Products 
Targeting the products developed in the manufacturing process would 
involve embedding an exploit either through software, firmware, or hardware in 
the end product which would give at attacker control of the product to enable 
disrupting or denying its use in future operations. For example, if such an exploit 
was embedded in the control system of a missile could allow an attacker to 
control the flight of the missile after launch, diverting it from its intended target or 
possibly sending it to a new target. In a cyber-coercion attack, demonstrating 
control over an adversary’s weapons would deny the adversary the use of such 
weapons. 
Such an exploit could be embedded as a backdoor, allowing the attacker 
to have future access to the product, or as a logic bomb. A logic bomb is 
malicious code which is designed to sabotage operations when certain conditions 
are met. In the example of the missile, a logic bomb could execute when a 
certain condition was met such as being fired, achieving a certain altitude, or 
being given certain coordinates for targeting. An example of a logic bomb attack 
occurred in a 2013 attack against South Korean banks and broadcasting 
companies. The logic bomb was propagated via an email phishing scheme. It 
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was written to be executed at a specific time and simultaneously deleted hard 
drives and master boot records of at least three banks and two broadcasting 
companies (Zetter, 2013). 
While an attack on the end product of the manufacturing process can 
prevent the product from operating as designed, it is important for the attacker to 
control when and where the attack occurs to have the best effect in cyber 
coercion. It also allows the attacker to conduct an attack which may be 
reversible. Should the conditions of the cyber-coercion operation be met 
favorably for the attacker, the embedded code could be removed or revealed to 
allow the compromised product to return to its initial, uncompromised condition. 
As certain weapons and other pieces of equipment are essential to the 
operations of the military, critical items are stockpiled by the military supply 
system to ensure availability when needed. To ensure this attack could be used, 
it would be even more effective to attach the backdoor during the manufacturing 
process to be able to compromise all products in the inventory. This would 
require access to the manufacturing process before hostilities began. Access 
could be achieved using other cyber methods or by gaining physical access to 
the manufacturing equipment. 
A successful attack would require that the malicious code or other exploit 
not be discovered. Discovery would not only compromise the ability to conduct 
cyber coercion, but also potentially cause escalations in hostilities as the victim 
may desire to take punitive action against the attacker if it is possible to identify 
them (something quite difficult). However, the risk of discovery may be low 
because of the prevalence of counterfeit parts, since a number have been found 
in U.S. military systems. A 2012 study by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) found that counterfeit parts are readily available from vendors used 
to procure military-grade electronic parts. Further, a 2012 Report of the 
Committee on Armed Service of the United States Senate reported that a study 
conducted in 2009 and 2010 found over 1,800 cases of counterfeit parts, totaling 
over 1,000,000 affected parts. Further, case studies presented in the report show 
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that many of the counterfeit cases included cases where the part was observed 
to not match expected physical characteristics, but was still used, and the 
counterfeit part was only removed after parts failed. So malicious code has a 
reasonable chance of not being detected as long as the equipment maintains its 
normal working condition until the attack is executed. 
c. Costs 
Attacks on the supply china can be expensive. Attacks on SCADA 
systems exploit vulnerabilities in computer hosts and the SCADA software which 
are only known to a few people, and they also require access to the limited-
access networks where these specialized hosts and software reside. 
Initial reconnaissance of the facility to be targeted is required to determine 
the computer hosts and SCADA software used. Vulnerabilities must then be 
determined and exploits created. As vulnerabilities are discovered by computer 
and software developers, patches and fixes are distributed as generated. While 
some systems may not be patched and remain vulnerable, zero-day exploits are 
preferred for an operation to have a high chance of succeeding.  
If the target was a more specialized or less common system such as 
Siemens SCADA systems, then the cost increases. In fact, the U.S. government 
runs a research facility, the SCADA Security Development Laboratory, which 
analyzes SCADA systems for vulnerabilities (“SCADA History,” 2012). The 
additional research necessary elevates the cost of an attack. One estimate of 
Stuxnet says that it cost over $10,000,000 to develop. Estimates of the time it 
would take to develop are between one and five man-years for programmers 
(Stark, 2011). 
Similarly, attacks on end products also have a high cost of entry. The cost 
of development is potentially higher than SCADA systems as the attacker must 
develop exploits for the computers within the manufacturing plant, the control 
systems of the equipment used to manufacture the product, or the product itself, 
all of which require solving specialized challenges. The cost of this type of attack 
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could be comparable to the previously discussed zero-day exploits. Reuter’s 
Joseph Menn claimed that the NSA paid RSA, a network and computer security 
company, $10 million to set an NSA developed algorithm, called Dual Elliptic 
Curve, as the default algorithm used to generate random numbers used in the 
BSafe cryptography software (2013). It was alleged that this random number 
generator has a backdoor in it, allowing the NSA to gain access to data 
encrypted using the software. Although this was a deal struck with the company 
producing the product, not an operation carried out against the product, it gives a 
good indication of, if true, the amount of money a government is willing to pay to 
gain access to end products. 
These costs are greater than for a denial-of-service attack, but cause a 
greater effect on the victim’s ability to conduct military operations and have a 
longer duration. 
d. Reversibility 
An attack which targets the software of the SCADA or end product and 
has not damaged any physical property is easy to reverse, if the coercer reveals 
how the necessary steps. If the attack is activated so that it actually damages or 
destroys physical property, this is not reversible. If the attack manipulated or 
damage hardware beyond repair, this would require the hardware be replaced. 
Further, other effects may have to be dealt with. The Maroochy water service 
attack caused environmental effects. A representative from the Australian 
Environmental Protection Agency said, “Marine life died, the creek water turned 
black and the stench was unbearable for residents” (Abrams & Weiss, 2008, p. 
1). Such consequences must be considered for an attack where physical effects 
are possible. 
e. Reusability 
Discovery of an attack on the manufacturing process may lead victim to 
review how the coercer was able to access their systems. This may lead to 
changes in policy that make it harder to access the system as before. For 
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example, if thumb drives were used to gain access into an air gapped network, 
the USB ports of the network might be administratively turned off to prevent their 
use. Other vulnerabilities that were used to access the target might also be 
discovered and mitigated. If discovered, this attack is hard to reuse. 
f. Legality 
Given the Tallinn Manual definition of cyber attacks, the legality of attacks 
during war on the manufacturing process of a supply chain is dependent upon its 
target and its intended effect. Attacks on SCADA systems can cause physical 
destruction and potential loss of life. In the two examples, the Maroochy attack 
and the Stuxnet attack, both qualify as attacks if placed in the context of 
international conflict as they both caused damage or destruction. If an attack on 
the SCADA system caused the system to simply not work correctly without 
damaging equipment and could be reversed without damaging the equipment 
and without other physical effects, the attack would be less likely to meet the 
threshold of a cyber attack. If this attack was conducted outside a time of war, it 
would likely be considered an illegal attack if the attack was designed to 
manipulate the controls within a military industry, especially if the attack caused 
physical effects. However, discovery of the attack prior to activation would not 
likely be classified as use of force as no force has taken place, merely the ability 
to use force. Further, the attack before activation may be indistinguishable from 
espionage. 
Attacks on SCADA systems also have a risk of collateral damage in that 
some SCADA systems used for military production purposes are also used for 
civilian purposes. This was demonstrated by the spread of the Stuxnet virus to 
targets that were not likely the intended target. As the virus sought to propagate 
itself and sought to exploit specific Siemens SCADA software, the virus would 
spread to computers that were not the intended target of the attacker; over 40% 
of the computers infected by Stuxnet were outside of the most probable target of 
Iran (McMillan, 2010). So an attack on SCADA systems could spread beyond its 
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intended target to critical infrastructure such as electrical grids. Such spreading 
of an attack could be prohibited under rule 51 of the Tallinn Manual, “A cyber 
attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is 
prohibited” (Schmitt, 2013, p. 132). 
Having the capability built into the product of being able to take control of it 
would not in itself be a cyber attack. It would cross the threshold of cyber attack 
when the code was activated and the product no longer operated as expected. In 
the example given of gaining control of a missile, this would occur when the 
missile did not operate as expected. If the attack was targeted against something 
not as disposable or used more than one time, such as a backdoor embedded 
into a computer chip, and was reversible in that the code could be removed or 
deactivated, it would be less likely to be recognized as a cyber attack as the 
operation could be designed to simply cause the system to not work for a short 
time without physical damage to equipment. 
3. Targeting Databases 
Databases are collections of data, organized to enable processing by 
users or systems. Some databases are extremely valuable to the owner because 
of the information they contain and the purpose the data is processed. If these 
valuable databases can be located, targeted, and rendered inaccessible to the 
adversary, a significant advantage may be gained by hindering the process or 
system the database supports. 
a. Encryption Attack Against Databases 
Databases are used extensively in supply chain management to track 
orders, monitor inventory, oversee transportation, and do numerous other data 
tracking tasks. Their importance and extensive use provide a good target for 
cyber coercion. By removing access to a database, an attacker can affect all 
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parts of a supply chain, including ordering, manufacturing, transportation, and 
distribution. 
A potential attack against a database would be to use reversible 
cryptography. A reversible cryptography attack encrypts selected adversary data, 
preventing the adversary from having access to the encrypted data, then 
decrypts the data at the end of hostilities (Rowe, 2010).This type of attack does 
not modify or delete the data, but only prevents the adversary from being able to 
use it This type of attack could be accomplished using public-key cryptography, 
an asymmetric-key cryptographic procedure which uses two keys, a public key 
and a private key. Data encrypted with one key can be decrypted with the other 
key. In practice, the public key is available publicly and anyone can encrypt data 
which only the older of the private key can decrypt. This is commonly used in 
digital signatures, key transport, and key agreement (Kuhn, Hu, Polk, & Chang, 
2001). A public key could be delivered by some malicious code to an adversary’s 
database. When activated, the code would use the public key to encrypt the data, 
rendering the data inaccessible until decrypted using the private key. A message 
could then be relayed to the adversary that their data will be decrypted once the 
desired conditions are met. This reversible attack allows the desired effect of the 
cyber attack to be achieved without destruction of data. 
An advantage of using asymmetric keys is that should the key embedded 
in the system be discovered, it would not decrypt the data. A disadvantage 
compared to symmetric keys is that encryption by public key schemes is slower 
(Kuhn et al., 2001).This could be overcome by creating a symmetric key for the 
encryption process, and then the symmetric key could be encrypted using the 
public key. The encrypted key could then be stored until the attacker decrypted it 
using the private key. This would avoid the potential loss of the attack should the 
malicious code be discovered during the encryption process. 
The code could be delivered by gaining access to the system using a 
vulnerability discovered during the reconnaissance phase or by targeting an 
unsuspecting system user using spam emails containing the malicious code. For 
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systems not accessible to the Internet, targeting system users with infected 
thumb drives and other removable media could allow access. 
Launching the attack could be done by having the malicious code call 
back to the attacker for instructions or by inserting a logic bomb to control when 
the attack would occur. Using the logic bomb has the advantage of not being 
dependent upon communications between the attacker and the victim’s database 
after the code has been inserted. However, it also has the added risk of not being 
able to be controlled once the code is inserted. The attacker may not be able to 
prevent the attack from occurring once he has inserted the code into the 
database system, even if earlier steps in coercion have succeeded in effecting a 
change in the adversary. 
In September 2013 this type of attack was used in a program called 
CryptoLocker (Jarvis, 2013). This malware was ransomware, malware which 
exploits system vulnerabilities to gain access and encrypt data files to prevent a 
user from using or accessing their files unless a ransom payment is paid. This 
often involves a transfer of funds using online accounts or digital currency (Luo & 
Liao, 2009). CryptoLocker was initially disseminated using spam email containing 
malicious attachments with the CryptoLocker executable. Later, it was distributed 
using the peer-to-peer Gameover Zeus malware. Spam email would be sent to a 
user containing a malicious attachment that contained code which would 
download Upatre malware, which would then download and execute Gameover 
Zeus, which would download CryptoLocker onto the user’s computer. Once on 
the computer, the malware would attempt to reach back to a command-and-
control server. Once the connection was established, the server would generate 
a 2048-bit RSA key pair and pass the public key to the malware. The malware 
would then encrypt targeted files. CryptoLocker was written to target files based 
on their extension. A window would appear on the user’s screen informing them 
that their files had been encrypted and providing instructions on how to pay the 
ransom to restore the files, usually on the order of several hundred dollars. A 
timeline was given for paying the ransom before the private key was to be 
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destroyed. If the ransom was paid, the program then decrypted the files, 
restoring them to the victim (Abrams, 2013). By April 2014, over 234,000 
computers were estimated to have been infected by CryptoLocker and tens of 
millions had been paid in ransom (DOJ, 2014). CryptoLocker has demonstrated 
that an encryption attack is possible, and by the amount of ransom paid, that it 
has a great effect on the victims. 
This type of attack requires extensive reconnaissance prior to initiating. 
The attacker must target a database of enough significance that the victim is 
unwilling to continue hostilities and will acquiesce to the demands of the attacker. 
The attacker must also determine if backup copies of the database are kept, or 
else the victim could restore the database, rendering the attack considerably less 
serious. If backup copies are kept on the network, these backups must also be 
removed either by deletion or encryption to ensure the database could not be 
restored. If tape backups are created, the attacker could target the backup 
process prior to the attack on the database to have all recent backups be 
corrupted. The attacker might also replicate the attack several times, increasing 
the amount of data lost since the last successful backup prior to the attack until 
enough data is lost that the attack on the database is effective. 
b. Costs 
This type of attack is not expensive once access to a target system has 
been achieved. Encryption commonly occurs with data transmission and storage 
on networks, and key pairs can be generated using readily available software. 
MalwareMustDie, a security research group, found that a malware similar to 
CryptoLocker called Prison Locker was being sold online for $100 (unixfreaxjp, 
2014). The biggest cost would come in determining the database or databases to 
encrypt and gaining access to them using known or discovered vulnerabilities. 
c. Reversibility 
This attack is reversible, if the coercer gives over the private key, or if the 
coercer maintains or is given access to the target database. The encryption will 
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not manipulate the data, but only prevent its use without the key. Thus, this 
attack is completely reversible. 
d. Reusability 
The encryption attack itself is reusable. Even if the private key is revealed, 
if a secure encryption scheme is used, the attack can be repeated using a new 
public-private key pair. However, access to the database may be denied. To 
reuse this attack, a new method of accessing the database will be required. 
e. Legality 
As the encryption is reversible and does not damage the data, this 
operation does not meet the threshold of a cyber attack. However, if the 
operation occurred while the two nation-states were not at war, because the 
operation targets the cyber infrastructure of another state, it would be a violation 
of sovereignty as defined in rule 3 of the Tallinn Manual, “any interference by a 
State with cyber infrastructure aboard a platform, wherever located, that enjoys 
sovereign immunity constitutes a violation of sovereignty.” (Schmitt, 2013, p. 29) 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter surveyed attack methods that could be used to target 
portions of the supply chain. The target chosen could be based on what is 
believed to be best to coerce the adversary to take no further hostile action, and 
also could be based on what parts are accessible. Targets such as 
communications within a supply chain may be targeted cheaply, but with a short 
duration. Targets within a manufacturing process incur a higher cost, but with a 
potential greater effect. Database targets provide a cheap and effective method 
of denying an adversary access to data. It is important that the method find a 
balance between providing enough pain to the adversary to discourage them 
from continuing their action without applying so much that escalation occurs.  
A favorable characteristic of many of these attacks is reversibility. This is 
something that cyber warfare can provide to commanders as a tool for achieving 
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the goals of a military objective without the destructive nature of kinetic weapons. 
Though many of these tools are reversible, those that are not still could produce 
less destruction to achieve the same goal as kinetic weapons. These tools do not 
have to operate independently and can be used together with other tools and the 
threat of further kinetic force to drive the effect of denying the adversary access 





In this chapter, three scenarios will be presented and analyzed, each 
using one of three cyber-coercion attacks previously described in Chapter III. The 
scenarios show the threat of additional or continual attacks, including both cyber 
or kinetic, against various types of adversaries can encourage de-escalation. By 
having cyber coercive attacks available as options to military commanders and 
national decision makers, additional opportunities short of conventional warfare 
exist to further U.S. interests. The application of such strategy exists in situations 
where U.S. action is desired, but there is little public or political support for full 
scale military operations. 
Cyber operations in support of military objectives hold advantages over 
other military operations. While cyber operations can cause physical destruction 
and even lead to loss of life, the cost of achieving the objectives of the operation 
can be much less than having to mobilize, deploy, and support combat soldiers. 
It also could allow for military operations without soldiers being placed in harm’s 
way. Having a lower cost and less risk to military forces in achieving the same 
objective can lead to greater support for cyber operations verses conventional 
military operations. Further, a nation-state might have an obligation by the 
principle of unnecessary risk and harm to use cyber methods over kinetic 
methods with the same capabilities for legal purposes (Denning & Strawser, 
2014). 
This exercise is important. Before conducting an operation, or when 
determining what actions other nations might take, the military reviews possible 
outcomes to determine what might be the most likely outcome and the most 
dangerous outcome. This enables decision makers to understand the risks and 
gains for each possible operation. As mentioned previously by 
CDRUSCYBERCOM, U.S. cyber forces remain in the early stages of being able 
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to do this. Cyber forces need to be able to present the expected outcomes for 
different cyber operations, including those launched by the United States, those 
launched against the United States, and those launched between other nations. 
This chapter seeks to further this endeavor. 
B. SCENARIO BACKGROUND 
For these scenarios, an encryption attack, a distributed denial-of-service 
attack, and a SCADA attack, will be discussed in different situations. The method 
will be described including the type of attack, the target of the attack, and the 
attribution, termination, and possible responses by the adversary. The measure 
of effectiveness of a coercive attack will be the degree to which the attack leads 
to escalating the conflict or not. As the goal is to enable the coercer to further its 
international interests while preventing conflicts from escalating, if the method is 
likely lead to escalation of cyber or kinetic weapons by either side, it will be 
considered not successful. 
For the scenarios, these attacks will be launched by the same coercer. 
This coercer is a modern nation with a highly capable military with world-wide 
reach and a sophisticated cyber capability, including both offensive and 
defensive abilities. These scenarios will also include discussion on possible 
effects if the United States was the subject of the coercive operation. 
The purpose of coercion is to use the threat of force to compel your 
adversary to take a desired action or to deter the adversary from taking an 
undesired action. Sometimes a show of force is necessary to demonstrate the 
ability of the coercer to conduct an action and to show the credibility of the threat 
of further force. This may be something more of a demonstration such as a 
carrier strike group transiting the Strait of Hormuz, a massing of military forces 
such as Operation Paul Bunyan where a large contingent of ground and air 
elements were massed near the Korean Demilitarized Zone in support of a tree 
clearing operation, or an actual attack, such as Commodore Decatur’s capture of 
the Dey of Algeria’s flagship in the Second Barbary War. All these actions 
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intended to communicate the message that the United States has the ability to 
cause pain to the adversary. 
With cyber weapons, it is not as easy to conduct a show of force in 
comparison to a Strait of Hormuz transit. With nuclear weapons, testing may not 
only serve to gain knowledge of the use of the weapon, but also sends a signal to 
would be adversaries that your country has such ability. This demonstration is 
not possible with cyber weapons. Once a cyber weapon is used, the adversary 
has the opportunity to reverse engineer the attack to strength their cyber 
defenses to prevent the attack from working again. Something more similar to 
Commodore Decatur’s action is required, where an actual cyber attack is made 
with the threat of more cyber attacks or even kinetic attacks to follow if the 
desired action is not taken. As such, the risk of escalation is increased. Each 
method analyzed in the scenarios will be treated as a show of force, where the 
coercer demonstrates their ability to apply pain to the adversary with the attack, 
while the threat for more attacks lingers if action is not taken. 
For the scenarios, the important factors previously discussed for cyber 
coercion will be discussed, as appropriate. The reversibility and reusability of the 
attack will be discussed, along with its implications. The legality of the coercive 
operation will be reviewed using the Tallinn Manual as the basis. Additionally, 
both self-attributed and non-attributed attacks will be analyzed. Given that the 
need for attribution still remains disputed in cyberwarfare, these scenarios will 
include attacks launched using both perspectives. 
C. SCENARIO ONE 
The first scenario is a cyber coercion operation conducted in which 
supply-chain databases are encrypted using public keys against an adversary 
who has modern cyber capabilities with positive attribution. The scenario is 




1. Attack Description 
The adversary in this scenario is assumed to be a modern country with 
advanced cyber capabilities including defensive and offensive capabilities. Their 
military is modern with a global reach on a par with the coercer military. This 
country utilizes the Internet for their supply chain in similar ways the coercer 
military does, for communications, supporting automation of manufacturing 
processes, procurement, managing inventory, overseeing transportation, 
scheduling deliveries, and processing orders.  
For this scenario, assume the adversary is postured or is currently 
invading a neighboring nation with whom the coercer is allied or partnered with. 
This scenario also assumes that because of this alliance and the hostile 
situation, the coercing nation-state is supporting its ally in its right to use armed 
force for self-defense against an armed attack. A cyber operation could serve to 
coerce the adversary into taking an action favorable to the coercer. This action 
might be withdrawing troops from a neighboring country or to standing down from 
posturing for a potential attack. The goal of the attack is to disrupt the supply-
chain process of the adversary, in conjunction with the posturing of coercer 
military forces, in a manner which causes the adversary to not escalate the 
situation. 
To be effective, the cyber attack would need to target databases of 
significant value to the supply chain. The databases need to be essential so that 
without the information contained within, the supply chain is greatly hampered. 
The databases cannot be easily replaced and must be an essential component of 
the supply chain. Prior reconnaissance could enable the coercer to determine the 
appropriate target; good potential targets include databases containing order 
information, inventory, or coordination of transportation and delivery of supplies. 
Targeting essential supplies such as military food, fuel, and ammunition could 
increase the effectiveness of the attack. Denying the ability of the adversary to 
access the data within these databases could severely hinder their ability to 
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conduct military operations by disrupting the ability of the adversary to deliver 
supplies to their troops in forward operating areas. 
Access to the database could be done during the reconnaissance phase. 
Given the adversary has advanced defensive capabilities, the adversary could 
detect that the coercer has accessed their networks. This could be seen by the 
adversary as routine penetration or espionage. While the adversary may react by 
bolstering security, espionage is not considered an act of war and would not be 
expected to lead to an escalation of hostilities, given how often these types of 
occurrences have become (Lewis, 2010). This cyber weapon could be left 
installed on the target database prior to the decision to execute. This could be 
activated by a logic bomb on a certain date or by accessing via a backdoor. A 
logic bomb would be similar to an attack against South Korea seen in March 
2013 which embedded itself onto banking and broadcasting companies systems 
and was activated on a specific date and time (Zetter, 2013). Further, if the 
encryption could use public-key encryption, if the payload of the cyber weapon 
were compromised, only the public key would be exposed so the attack could not 
be analyzed until deployed.  
Upon activation of the attack, the database would become encrypted 
using the public key which only the private key could decrypt. The adversary will 
have lost all ability to access the encrypted information of the database. At this 
time, the coercer could expose that they were behind the attack. Attribution 
would help further the message that the adversary forces need to be withdrawn 
or face further action by coercer forces. The cyber attack would cripple the 
adversary from being able to conduct operations and the associated threat of 
force, both additional encryption attacks and kinetic force, would seek to 
persuade the adversary to not escalate the conflict. 
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2. Possible Outcomes 
At this point, the adversary could acquiesce to coercer demands and 
maintain the status quo, respond with cyber attacks against the coercer, or 
escalate the situation and engage in kinetic action with coercer forces. 
The first possible outcome is that the adversary acquiesces to coercer 
demands. They could signal to the coercer that they do not intend to continue 
their operations and either completely withdraw their forces or seek a negotiated 
settlement between the adversary, the coercer, and the neighboring country. 
Driving the adversary to the negotiating table would achieve the objects of this 
scenario. This would be the most beneficial outcome to the coercer. Upon the 
adversary demonstrating their compliance with coercer demands, the database 
would be decrypted. The database would be returned to use by the adversary 
with no permanent damage done. 
At this point, the adversary made be able to return to their previous 
aggressive state. Since the attack was only temporary, the supply chain and 
military forces return to the same condition as they were before the database 
was attacked. The adversary would likely also determine how the database was 
accessed and harden the security of the networks to prevent the exploit was 
being used again. It can be assumed that any exploits left behind on the 
databases would be discovered and additional backups of the database created. 
These actions by the adversary would make it difficult to redeploy the same 
attack using the same vulnerability. However, there are likely many 
vulnerabilities, and since the encryption process itself is still secure, the attack 
could be replicated against other databases using these new vulnerabilities. So 
though the exact attack may not be possible, the same style of attack remains 
possible. This threat of further similar attacks serves to compel the adversary to 
compile with coercer demands. The adversary becomes aware of a cyber 
capability of the coercer, knows that the coercer is willing to use the capability, 
and knows the effect the capability has. This will serve to encourage the 
adversary to not return to their previous aggressive state. 
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The second possible course of action by the adversary is to respond to the 
coercer attack by launching their own cyber attacks. This would not require that 
the adversary assume the attack met the threshold of a cyber attack or an act of 
war. Capable cyber forces likely have advance persistent threats (APT) within 
potential adversarial networks. APT’s are cyber operations which seek to gain 
and hold access to a network. These can be used for intelligence gathering or as 
footholds for launching cyber attacks. A cyber force may access a network, plant 
malicious code within the network, and wait to execute the code until the desired 
time. For example, the Mandiant report (Mandiant, 2013) revealed that Chinese 
military forces have APT’s within U.S. networks which are used to conduct cyber 
espionage, resulting in hundreds of terabytes of data stolen from 141 different 
organizations in 20 different industrial sectors. Given the extensive access to 
networks by this APT, the possibility exists that malicious codes and cyber 
weapons may be planted on these networks, waiting for future offensive use. 
Viewing the encryption attack against their databases as requiring a response, 
the victim country may begin similar attacks against coercer networks, both 
military and commercial networks, using their APT’s as starting places. This 
could lead to an escalation of cyber warfare between the coercer and the target 
country.  
The third possibility is that the target country responds to the cyber 
operation with non-cyber military action against the coercer. Their justification for 
escalating the hostilities would be that the encryption attack violated their 
sovereignty and given the potentially already heated situation between the 
coercer and the targeted country, this would be the cause for war. This is not 
likely since the operation doesn’t meet the threshold for a cyber attack, and the 
international community would not view it as a proportional response. It would be 
the most dangerous outcome, and could occur if the target country has been 
subjected to a series of repeated setbacks with a common origin country. 
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3. Scenario Conclusions 
The outcome of this scenario is that the adversary in unable to access 
their data and acquiesces to the coercers demands. However, there is a risk that 
the adversary responds with non-cyber effects or in kind to the encryption attack 
with their own cyber counterattacks. The ability of a nation-state to resort to non-
cyber responses to cyber attacks has been argued by the United States. 
CDRUSCRYBERCOM said regarding the U.S. response to the hack on Sony 
Pictures, “Merely because something happens to us in the cyber arena, doesn’t 
mean that our response has to be focused in the cyber arena” (Frizell, 2015, 
para. 6). Nation-states using cyber coercion methods must be ready to deal with 
responses outside the cyber domain. Coercer cyber defenses must be ready to 
handle attacks against our own networks. Many states target non-government 
commercial networks for industrial espionage. These may serve as potential 
targets for cyber counterattacks during a conflict. The coercer must be prepared 
for a cyber conflict to include systems and networks that will have a direct effect 
on the civilian population of the coercer.  
The strength of this attack lies in the strength of the encryption and the 
difficulty of restoring the attacked resources from backup. If the encryption 
scheme was compromised, the attack would lose most of its effectiveness; 
strong encryption schemes must be used, and the private key must be securely 
stored to prevent being compromised. Encryption also serves to make the attack 
reversible, restoring the database at the end of hostilities to its antebellum state. 
The effectiveness of an adversary’s backup methods will also be important, and 
can vary considerably; intelligence can provide some clues. An added strength of 
this attack is causing the adversary to lose confidence in their other military 
databases. Having demonstrated the ability to gain access and encrypt a 
database, the adversary could lose confidence that their other databases have 
not been accessed and manipulated by the coercer. 
This attack is very promising, but requires extensive reconnaissance and 
development and has the risk of causing an escalation of cyber warfare between 
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the coercer and the adversarial state. Use against a less capable nation would 
reduce this threat. Even against a more capable nation, the operation may cause 
the adversary to lose confidence in other military databases. This lack of faith in 
their own data may serve to be advantageous for the coercer in placing the 
adversary in a position where they are uncertain of their ability to conduct 
operations. 
4. Susceptibility of the United States to This Coercion 
An encryption attack against the United States could cause similar 
debilitation. As this attack has already been seen in the wild in the form of 
CryptoLocker, administrators of databases need to ensure that their databases 
are up-to-date in security and regular backups are made, including backups that 
are not connected to the network. 
 
D. SCENARIO TWO 
The second scenario is a cyber-coercion operation in which supply-chain 
management communications are disrupted using distributed denial-of-service 
tactics against an adversary who has lacks modern cyber capabilities, without 
attributing the source of the attack. The scenario further assumes an adversary 
led by a repressive regime who is actively putting down a populist uprising which 
is seeking to overthrow the regime. The coercing nation is seeking to end the 
actions of the regime, though without U.N. authorization for military operations. 
The scenario will analyze the possible outcomes of a cyber-coercion operation in 
response to the coercer demonstrating this capability. 
1. Attack Description 
The adversary in this scenario is a developing country with limited 
defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. Their military is moderately capable 
with a regional reach. Assume this country uses the Internet less for their supply 
chain than the coercer military does, but still uses the Internet for 
 55 
communications, supporting automation of manufacturing processes, 
procurement, managing inventory, overseeing transportation, scheduling 
deliveries, and processing orders. Being a developing country, they likely have 
contracts with other countries to provide weapons and supplies necessary for 
their military. 
Targeting the distribution and transportation portion of the supply chain 
could potentially weaken the military of the regime. For instance in Syria during 
the current civil war, President Bashar al-Assad’s forces suffered low morale due 
to logistical issues hampering supplying forces fuel and food (Harding, 2012). 
This led to defections of forces and fears of the regime’s imminent fall. If a cyber 
attack could cause denial of logistical services, confidence of the military forces 
could be shaken as their forces would be placed at a tactical disadvantage. 
There are several considerations in planning a denial-of-service attack like 
this. These include collateral damage, the legal status of the target, and the legal 
status of the attack. 
Denial-of-service attacks on networks can cause collateral damage on 
other networks. As the Internet is a shared medium for communication, the 
excess traffic generated in the attack may disrupt traffic and cause unintended 
services to be degraded or denied. If the nation-states were at war, the target of 
the DDOS attack would be legal as it is a military objective, assuming it means 
other requirements such as necessary and proportionate (Schmitt, 2013). 
Further, this type of cyber operation does not rise to the level of a cyber attack 
(Schmitt, 2013). However, since the nation-states are not at war, this legally falls 
under the more ambiguous legal status discussed in Chapter III. As discussed, a 
DDOS attacks is not likely to be considered a use of force. Given this, caution 
must be taken regarding collateral damage as critical systems could be affected. 
If an operation was to take down critical infrastructure such as the electrical grid 
or controls for a hydroelectric dam, physical damage could occur. Such 
unintended consequences may serve as justification for the victim to retaliate 
against the coercer and elevate the operation to the level of an attack. 
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If this attack occurred while in a war, since governments use private 
companies to support military supply chains, this attack could target a non-
military network and include civilian objects. However, it falls within the accepted 
exception to civilian targeting in the Geneva Conventions for industries 
contributing to military preparedness. Since the target is a valid military objective, 
it would still be a valid target for a cyber attack (Schmitt, 2013). This could 
possibly provide justification of the type of attack for the coercer, if the attack was 
attributed to them, though the coercer would still need to justify the attack in the 
first place. However, if the country has contracts with larger, more modern 
countries to support its military supply chain, targeting must be careful to not 
target systems of the supporting country. An attack on the supporting country 
could lead escalating hostilities between the coercer and the supporting country, 
creating a larger international diplomatic issue than before, if the attack was 
attributed. 
This attack would be expected to be limited in duration. As previously 
discussed in Chapter III, the average distributed denial-of-service attack lasts 
only 29 hours. Once the attack is detected, mitigations can be put in place by the 
victim to block attacking IP addresses and to absorb the volume of the attack on 
the target servers. Cloud-computing companies such as Akamai provide 
resources for customers which are able to absorb DDOS attacks and other 
defensive mechanisms to mitigate the effect (“The Challenge,” n.d.). This greatly 
reduces the ability for the attack to be used again. A military observing an 
essential network being susceptible to a denial- of-service attack would work to 
strengthen the defense of not only this network, but other similar networks. While 
the attack may be able to be used again against other networks in the short term, 
it is not likely that this type of attack would have long effectiveness. 
This attack could be difficult to publicly attribute to the coercer. Given that 
this attack does not rise to the Tallinn Manual level of a cyber attack, not 
attributing itself to the attack may allow the coercer to incur the benefits of the 
attack with freedom from attribution if desired. Non-attribution also may be 
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desirable if a non-state actor is acting on behalf of a nation-state. A nation-state 
might provide a non-state actor with the technology or tools necessary for the 
desired operation. If a nation-state was to hire or encourage a non-state hacker 
group to conduct an operation against the target state, they may be able to deny 
involvement in the operation. However, though the operation is conducted by the 
non-state actor, the support provided by the nation-state may violate international 
law (Schmitt, 2013). 
2. Possible outcomes 
There are several possible outcomes based on how the victim nation 
responses. These include responding to the cyber operation by acceding to the 
desired behavior, responding with cyber attacks against the coercer, or no major 
change to their operations. 
If successful, the cyber operation can cause a shortage of key supplies 
such as fuel for military forces in the target country. This fuel shortage places it at 
a tactical disadvantage, and this coupled with the fear of another DDOS attack 
and pressure from the coercer and the international community to cease its 
military response to the populist uprising, may cause the victim country to back 
down. They may see their current position as not favorable for further military 
actions. Given their lack of will to continue military operations, they may have 
negotiations with opposition leaders and the military situation could be diffused. 
Though this may be the most favorable outcome for the coercer, this 
outcome is not likely based solely on a DDOS attack. Previous DDOS attacks, 
while having short term effects on the targets, have been mere annoyances. 
They are not likely to be reproducible given the hardening of to the target 
networks and services after the initial assault. Their impact is minimal beyond the 
frustrations caused by denial of services. 
If the adversary determines or believes that the attack came from the 
coercer, a military kinetic response is not expected. Since the attack did not meet 
the requirement of a cyber attack, there would not be justification for a traditional 
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military response. However, they country may respond with cyber warfare of their 
own. Even if the target country does not have extensive cyber offensive 
capabilities, similar countries have been able to launch cyber attacks against 
coercers on soft targets. During the Syrian civil war, the Syrian Electronic Army 
attacked Western Websites by redirecting site traffic to false sites (Newcomb, 
2015). During the conflict against ISIL, Western social media accounts were 
compromised by hacking passwords, including the Twitter account of U.S. 
Central Command (Lamothe, 2015). While these attacks were not significant, 
they did garnish national attention. Iran has also launched denial-of-service 
attacks against U.S. banking Websites (Gorman & Barnes, 2014). Iran was also 
able to launch an attack against a military target, the Navy Marine Corps Intranet 
(NMCI). In 2013, it was reported that Iran had infiltrated the unclassified network 
and conducted intelligence gathering (Gorman & Barnes, 2014); this attack took 
several months to fully recover from.  
A third possibility is that the attack has minimal effect on the target country 
since many DOS attacks can be recovered from quickly. During the 2008 cyber 
attack against Georgia, Georgian sites which were taken down by denial-of-
service attacks could be restored on servers that were not subject to the attack 
including commercial servers such as Google or servers in other countries 
(Moses, 2008). The attack was certainly a disruption, but the effectiveness is 
hard to judge as it coincided with ground operations. In 2007, a large attack 
against Estonian Websites was launched due to Estonia moving a World War II 
Soviet memorial, and the attacks lasted for over a week; NATO and other 
international support was sought to secure Estonian networks, but the statue was 
still moved (“Estonian fines man,” 2008; Joubert, 2013). These denial-of-service 
attacks, while annoying, did not serve to meet their objective. 
3. Scenario Conclusions 
This type of attack could be quite limited in its effect against an adversary 
as described. Due to the limited duration, it is not likely to be able to stop a 
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military. Thus, this type of attack would be mostly ineffective for a cyber coercion 
operation. 
It may be better if targeted in specific tactical situations to support 
operations. For example, if coercer forces launch a DDOS attack on an air-
defense network to prevent nodes from being able to communicate, air defenses 
could be temporarily compromised, allowing coercer aircraft to safely enter a 
denied area. Also, as seen in the DDOS attacks against Estonia and Georgia, 
civilian morale can suffer when civilian infrastructure such as financial institutions 
is denied. This ability to erode civilian morale by targeting civilian infrastructure 
likely extends to targeting social media. Countries dealing with uprisings, such as 
Syria, have turned off the Internet within their country, possible to disrupt 
protestors utilizing social media (Thompson, 2013). By disrupting the ability of 
people to use social media, the morale of the civilian base could drop. This 
targeting of civilian morale does not by itself constitute a cyber attack (Schmitt, 
2013). However, explicitly targeting civilian infrastructure with cyber weapons 
would be against international law. 
4. Susceptibility of the United States to This Coercion 
This type of attack is already seen in the United States, both against 
military and commercial networks. The networks operated by the DOD are 
routinely attacked and this includes DDOS attacks (Chandler & Loyless, 2009). A 
recent DOD study showed that DOD network services are vulnerable to a DDOS 
attack (OSD, 2015). While susceptible, given previous DDOS attacks, the 
duration of the attacks is likely to be short given the ability to move services to 
other servers, block attacking hosts, and absorb DDOS attacks. 
E. SCENARIO THREE 
The third scenario is a cyber coercion operation in which the 
manufacturing portion of the supply chain is targeted to embed a backdoor into a 
weapon system which allows the coercer to control the weapon. This will be 
targeted against an adversary who has modern cyber capabilities with positive 
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attribution. The scenario assumes an adversary is currently engaged in combat 
operations against the coercer or a partner nation.  
1. Attack Description 
The adversary in this scenario is assumed to be a modern country with 
advanced cyber defensive and offensive capabilities. Their military is modern 
with a global reach. This country has modern weapon systems which are 
manufactured in modern industrial facilities. These facilities use networks for 
controlling SCADA equipment and other automated processes and often are 
unknowingly connected to the Internet (Klick & Marzin, 2013). 
The operation could serve to coerce the adversary into ceasing combat 
operations by denying the adversary use of their weapons system. During 
combat operations, the coercer would force the weapon system to not act as 
expected, either by not functioning or by not being able to strike its intended 
target. The coercer would take credit for the weapon system’s failure. This would 
place the adversary at a tactical disadvantage, force the adversary to cease use 
of the weapon system or reconfigure it, and spread fear that other weapon 
systems are also compromised. 
The attack would need to target a weapon system of significant value like 
a missile system. If the coercer were able to embed a backdoor or a logic bomb 
into the guidance system of the missile that could be accessed at the time the 
missile is fired, the coercer could direct where the missile goes, potentially 
missing its target or hitting a target chosen by the coercer By demonstrating 
control of the missile, the adversary would lose confidence in the weapon. The 
weapon would need to be taken out of use until the exploit is discovered and 
removed. If the adversary has many missiles that are dispersed, this could be a 
significant task. 
For this weapon system, the coercer may already have kinetic capabilities 
of achieving the same end results of denying the adversary use of the weapon. 
However, by conducting this cyber compromise of the weapon, the coercer can 
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drive greater effects than just denying the use of the missile. The cyber 
compromise allows for the coercer to manipulate use of the weapon regardless 
of its location and the location of coercer defense systems. It also drives fear into 
the adversary that other weapon systems may be compromised, and significant 
efforts may be exerted to look for possible vulnerabilities in other systems. Since 
weapons are stockpiled by militaries, this exploit would need to be implanted 
potentially years before it might be used.  
Access to the manufacturing process could allow access to the 
programming of the weapon system to achieve the goal. Though many SCADA 
systems are intended to not be accessible to the Internet, researchers from the 
Freie Universität Berlin have discovered that many SCADA systems have 
interfaces to the Internet (Klick & Marzin, 2013). Even if the SCADA system does 
not have an Internet access point, as in the Stuxnet attack, thumb drives and 
other removable data storage devices can gain access to isolated networks via 
willing or ignorant users (Sale, 2012). Accessing the process when the computer 
components are programmed and integrated into the weapon system would 
allow manipulating the code to inject a backdoor or logic bomb, allowing the 
coercer future access to the weapon or causing the weapon to not operate as 
expected. Another potential access point for injecting the vulnerability may be 
during maintenance of the weapon. 
There is potential that the exploit is discovered before it is activated to 
disable the weapon. Although it may do nothing to the weapon until activated, 
there is potential dispute between the coercer and the adversary as to whether 
the operation constitutes a cyber attack or not. The experts utilized for the Tallinn 
Manual were split if such operations met the threshold of an attack during a time 
of war. One argument is that the damage necessary for an attack does not occur 
until the exploit is activated. The other argument, explained by analogy within the 
Tallinn Manual, is “there is an attack whenever a person is directly endangered 
by a mine laid” (p. 94). Given that the classification of this operation is 
ambiguous, the risk must be understood prior to executing it. If it was discovered 
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before the two nation-states entered a state of war, it would not be likely that this 
would be considered a use of force. Further, discovery of the exploit might not 
enable to victim to determine if the exploit was intended to control the weapon 
system or cyber espionage. 
Upon activation of the attack, it would be desirable that the coercer 
expose that they were behind the attack. In this situation, attribution would be 
important to strengthen the coercer’s message that the adversary forces need to 
cease hostilities as their trust in their weapon systems diminishes. The fear of 
further weapons failing and being placed in a tactically unfavorable position 
against the coercer or coercer-partner forces will be an incentive. 
2. Possible Outcomes 
The adversary has several reactions they may take after the coercer has 
demonstrated the ability to control their weapon system in combat. The 
adversary could acquiesce to coercer demands, change weapons they are using, 
or isolate and remove the exploit from the compromised weapon system and 
continue operations. 
If the adversary acquiesces to coercer demands, they could signal to the 
coercer that they do not intend to continue their operations and either completely 
withdraw their forces or seek a negotiated settlement between the adversary and 
the coercer and the coercer partner nation. Driving the adversary to the 
negotiating table would achieve the objects of this scenario. Upon the adversary 
demonstrating their compliance with coercer demands, the exploit could be 
removed as part of the negotiations. Allowing for the possibility of being able to 
use the exploit again allows for great leverage by the coercer  
A second possible course of action by the adversary is to change 
weapons. Since this is a capable military force, they have weapon systems that 
are likely not of the same effectiveness as the weapon system that has been 
compromised, but can be used for similar effects. By changing their weapon 
system, they could be able to continue their combat operations with 
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uncompromised weapons. This could be negative for the coercer if they do not 
have countermeasures for the alternate weapon systems, but if the coercer does 
have countermeasures and wants to encourage use of weapons that they have 
countermeasures for, this may be a very favorable outcome. By choosing which 
weapon systems are exploited, the coercer could steer an adversary to a weapon 
system of the coercer’s desire. In this case, cyber coercion is not realized, but a 
tactical advantage is gained. 
The third possibility is that the target country finds the exploits, removes 
the exploits, and places the weapon system back into service. This may be 
possible if an original exploit-free copy is available as backup. This would be the 
most dangerous outcome for the coercer. It returns the conflict to its condition 
before the exploit was activated. Despite years of development, implanting the 
exploit, and activating the exploit, the advantage gained by the coercer is lost. 
Further, the adversary may reverse-engineer the exploit and reuse it against the 
other states.  
3. Scenario Three Conclusion 
The desired outcome of this scenario is that the adversary coerces to the 
demands of the coercer as the adversary is unable to use the targeted weapon 
system. If the exploit is placed in multiple systems, a greater effect is gained. 
More weapons are taken out of service and the confidence of the adversary in 
their own weapons diminished. If enough weapon systems are taken out by this 
cyber operation, or if the enemy is placed in a severe enough tactical 
disadvantage, the cyber operation may serve to coerce the adversary into 
meeting coercer demands. However, there is the possibility that the adversary 
resorts to another weapon system. Being able to drive the adversary to use an 
alternative weapon system for which countermeasures exist could turn this into a 
favorable outcome. 
The adversary may seek to increase their defenses of their SCADA 
systems and the software installation process of weapon systems. But unless the 
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exploit is found and removed, though the level of effort needed to infiltrate 
networks is increased, the original vulnerability remains and the attack can be 
used again in the future. This will serve as deterrence of future actions against 
the coercer as future adversaries will fear that they too may have exploited 
weapon systems. 
This type of attack requires early planning, extensive reconnaissance and 
development, and has the risk of being discovered. It must be of sufficient value 
and size to achieve the desired coercion effect. The success of this attack is 
found in undermining the adversary’s trust in their own weapon systems. 
Demonstrating control of one weapon system with a strategic message that other 
systems may be compromised puts the belief in the minds of the military forces, 
as well as the civilians, that their weapon systems cannot be trusted. This 
erosion of trust in the weapon systems may have a tremendous effect. This effect 
is seen in terrorist attacks which spread fear among a populace that though the 
attacks are few and risks of death or injury are low compared to normal daily 
activities, that the populaces trust in their government to protect them in 
undermined. 
4. Susceptibility of the United States to This Coercion 
This type of attack could be used against the United States. Many of the 
weapon systems used by the United States use precision guidance, and if that 
portion of the weapon were compromised, the weapon will be rendered 
inoperable. Further, as previously discussed in Chapter 3, many of the parts 
used by the U.S. military are manufactured overseas and the danger of 
compromised parts is significant. Further tightening quality of control for parts 
developed by the U.S. military’s supply chains is necessary to reduce the risk of 
compromised parts being placed into weapon systems. The security of industrial 
manufacturing needs to be reviewed as significant numbers of SCADA systems, 
including those in the United States, were discovered to be accessible on the 
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Internet. This is important for SCADA systems used in critical infrastructure such 
as water and electrical systems. 
F. ANALYSIS 
From these three scenarios, several insights are possible regarding the 
target of the attack, the size of the attack, and the ability for the attack to be 
reutilized. 
The target of the attack must be sufficient to place the adversary at a 
tactical disadvantage for the attack to be effective. This helps further the coercive 
effect of the attack by including the threat of effective military force against the 
adversary. This is expected to be achieved in an encryption or SCADA system 
attack. In the case of the DDOS attack, this is not likely given the expected short 
duration of the attack and the lack of achieving a threat beyond mere annoyance. 
The size of the attack must be sufficient to allow for the tactical 
disadvantage to be gained and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack. If 
the SCADA attack targeting a weapon system only took out one weapon, the 
effect is minimized and the threat message is not effective. However, the 
uncertainty about whether additional weapon systems have been compromised 
can place fear in the adversary that is advantageous for the coercer. If the DDOS 
attack was large enough to cause the services used by civilians to be disrupted, 
it may amplify the attack and might cause the morale of the civilians to turn 
against the regime (or perhaps against the coercer). However, it would be illegal 
to target civilian objects (Schmitt, 2013). 
Finally, the ability to reattack the adversary greatly increases the coercive 
effect of the attack. This is a weakness of both the DDOS attack and the supply-
chains attacks since adversaries can take measures quickly to ensure they are 
not repeated, at least in the same way. Note also that the encryption attack has a 
shorter turnaround time for development and redeployment. 
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Based on this analysis, the DDOS attack is not viable for a coercive 
strategy, while the encryption and supply-chain attacks are promising coercive 
strategies. All three may be useful for disrupting communications and supporting 
tactical combat operations, but the DDOS attack is not likely to create a big 
enough effect to force the adversary to acquiesce to coercion. The supply-chain 
attack targeting a weapon system can have the desired effect, but requires 
extensive planning and execution prior to combat operations. Furthermore, it 
risks escalating hostilities if discovered during a time of peace prior to execution. 
The encryption attack shows the most promise by achieving the desired effect, 
being reproducible, and minimizes damage to the system by being reversible. 
But it does require a certain degree of access to the target systems.  
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V. FINDINGS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. FINDINGS 
Targeting the supply chains of an adversarial military with cyber weapons 
can cripple the military to the point of being coerced to some desired activity of 
the coercer. This is advantageous to the United States in implementing its foreign 
policy and could be used by an adversary against the United States as well. 
The effect of coercion depends on the target of the attack and the type of 
the attack. Three targets within supply chains and three types of attacks were 
analyzed for their usefulness in a cyber coercion operation. These attacks had 
different advantages and disadvantages, however, some methods appear to be 
better suited than others for the task of coercing and adversary. 
The target must be significant enough to create enough pain when that 
portion is degraded in its operation, although this is difficult to judge. Regardless 
of the type of attack used, if it can successfully affect an essential link in the 
supply chain enough to cause sufficient pain to the victim, it can achieve the 
goal. Of the targets examined, targeting SCADA systems used in the 
manufacturing of and use of key weapon systems had the greatest effect. 
Targeting these components could render a military unable to continue its 
operations, at least without drastically adjusting their plans. 
The coercive attack must be sustained and reusable. If an attack can be 
easily terminated by the victim, it may be reduced to only being an annoyance, 
as with denial-of-service attacks: Though cheap to launch, their endurance is 
limited and many tactics can reduce their threat. Encryption attacks hold promise 
in being sustained and reusable. These attacks are hard to recover from without 
access to the key if restoration from backup is difficult. This allows the coercer to 
sustain the attack as long as desired. This attack can be reusable as using 
unique keys allows each attack to have some variation, though exploits to gain 
access to each system are still necessary and a new one may be needed for 
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each system. Reusability of an attack seems to be a premium in cyber warfare, 
so an attack which can be used and still maintains its future effectiveness is 
advantageous. 
Reversibility is a unique attribute of certain cyber attacks that gives cyber 
coercion operations additional flexibility and aids negotiations. While the 
necessary level of pain against the victim may be achieved without reversible 
attacks, having the ability to quickly reverse attacks and restore the data targeted 
could encourage negotiations to end the conflict and reduce the chance of 
escalating hostilities. Since reversible attacks could be low-scale while still 
maintaining their pressure, the coercer could reduce an attack to a level where 
the justification for the victim to respond with violence or kinetic options would be 
poor. Instead of crossing a line in the sand and forcing the victim to make a 
response, it allows the coercer to cross the line and force the victim to make a 
response, while allowing the coercer the option of restoring the line. Finally, 
should the victim acquiesce to the coercers demands, restoring services and 
databases targeted to their pre-conflict status is cheaper and easier than if 
violent coercive methods were used. 
Cyber warfare can be best accomplished technically by complete 
anonymity. However, to coerce an adversary, revealing the coercer is valuable. A 
victim may be more likely to be coerced by a nation-state than by a non-nation-
state, given the platitude that democracies refuse to negotiate with terrorists. 
Revealing the source of the coercion does expose the coercer to retribution, but 
may be necessary to make clear the coercer’s demands and encourage the 
victim into giving in. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research in cyber coercion should study the value of attribution in 
cyber warfare and the value of economic sanctions versus cyber coercion. 
Understanding the effect of attribution is important for decision makers to 
understand the risks and advantages of self-attributing an attack. To coerce and 
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demand something from someone, the person who is being coerced must usually 
know who is making the demand. However, previous attacks should be studied 
to see if they could have been more effective by the aggressor nation-state 
publicly attributing the attack. 
Economic sanctions and cyber coercion should be compared for 
effectiveness in achieving similar political objectives Economic sanctions are 
currently seen as a diplomatic method that should be used prior to military 
options. However, their effectiveness is not certain and the reasons are not well 
understood (Morgan & Schwebach, 1997). Additionally, sanctions can harm 
civilians in the target country more than to the government targeted (Weiss, 
1999). However, cyber coercion has its own disadvantages discussed earlier. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Cyber coercion, though currently limited as a foreign-policy tool, has 
promise of being able to manipulate an adversary to cause sufficient pain for the 
adversary to acquiesce to the coercer’s demand without escalating hostilities. 
Attacks on essential portions of supply chains, such as SCADA systems in the 
manufacturing portion or key databases, and encryption attacks, show the most 
promise of preventing the adversary from continuing unfavorable operations, 
while allowing the coercer to sustain the attack and reuse it in the future. The 
United States should explore the use of cyber coercion as part of its foreign 
policy as a supplement to other kinds of coercion, to continue furthering 
American influence in the world while reducing its military footprint. However, 
given the widespread availability of cyber weapons and the growing dependency 
of cyberspace for military applications, the United States must be prepared for 
these tactics to be used against itself. Failure to adequately appreciate the 
potential for these operations in the hands of adversaries could place the United 
States in a weakened defense position. 
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